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Introducción
El núcleo de una economía es el conjunto de todas las asignaciones o repartos
factibles que no están bloqueados por ninguna coalición de agentes. El hecho de
que una coalición de agentes bloquee o vete un reparto en una economía significa
que los agentes pertenecientes a ese grupo pueden redistribuir sus recursos y con-
seguir un reparto mejor que el inicial. Si esto ocurre, es posible que otros agentes
de la economía reaccionaran a este veto y, a su vez, propusieran una alternativa
contra el primer veto. Sin embargo, la definición de núcleo de una economía no
contempla este tipo consecuencias y solo tiene en cuenta las asignaciones que no
están vetadas por ninguna coalición, sin importar si los vetos son consistentes o
creíbles. El primer intento de formalizar una solución cooperativa que recogiera
este posible comportamiento menos miope de los agentes, incorporando credibi-
lidad y estabilidad a la definición de veto, fue el trabajo de Aumann y Maschler
(1964), donde se introducía la definición de conjunto de negociación, o bargaining
set, en el marco de la teoría de juegos. La idea principal de este nuevo concepto
era considerar solo aquellos vetos u objeciones frente a los que no se podía reac-
cionar con una contra-objeción. De esta manera, se eliminaban del proceso todas
aquellas objeciones que no eran creíbles, estables o justificadas.
Años más tarde, Mas-Colell (1989) adaptó el concepto de bargaining set a
economías continuas y demostró, bajo condiciones similares a las del teorema
de equivalencia core-Walras (Aumann, 1964), que el bargaining set coincide con
las asignaciones competitivas. Poco después, Vind (1992) propuso una definición
distinta a la de Mas-Colell en la que el bargaining set resultante es estrictamente
mayor que el núcleo de la economía. La principal diferencia entre ambos conceptos
radica en que en la noción de Vind las asignaciones asociadas con objeciones
deben ser factibles para todos los agentes de la economía, es decir, se especifica
qué reciben tanto los agentes que son miembros de la coalición que objeta como
los que no lo son. Por otra parte, en la noción de Mas-Colell, es suficiente que
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los repartos sean factibles para los miembros de las coaliciones implicadas en las
objeciones.
El mecanismo que conduce al bargaining set requiere implícitamente la for-
mación de todas las coaliciones, pero en una economía con muchos agentes, en
concreto en una economía sin átomos, es discutible que todas las coaliciones se
puedan formar sin coste alguno. En este sentido, Schmeidler (1972) argumentó
que se puede tomar la medida de una coalición como la cantidad de información
que se necesita para coordinar a los individuos a la hora de formar dicha coalición,
o si se prefiere, como el coste de formación. Los artículos de Schmeidler (1972),
Grodal (1972) y Vind (1972) sobre el núcleo de economías continuas mostraron
que no es necesario tener en cuenta todas las coaliciones para eliminar cualquier
asignación no competitiva (equivalentemente, para obtener el núcleo), lo que nos
condujo a aplicar las mismas ideas al caso del bargaining set y analizar cómo se
ve este afectado si se restringe el conjunto de coaliciones que se pueden formar.
Este estudio conforma el primer capítulo de esta memoria, donde consideramos
restricciones de distinta naturaleza sobre la formación de coaliciones, tanto en el
proceso de objeción como en el de contra-objeción, aplicadas tanto a la definición
de Mas-Colell como a la de Vind. Los resultados que obtenemos tienen una doble
vertiente: por un lado, caracterizamos el bargaining set de Vind con restricciones
en las coaliciones que pueden formarse y, por otra parte, presentamos ejemplos
donde se ponen de manifiesto las diferencias entre el concepto de Vind y de
Mas-Colell y que, además, ponen límites a la posibilidad de generalizar nuestros
resultados.
En esta línea, extendemos los resultados de Schjødt y Sloth (1994) mantenien-
do la terminología empleada en ese trabajo (local bargaining set para la definición
de Mas-Colell y global bargaining set para la de Vind). Nuestro primer resultado
establece que el global bargaining set es equivalente a aquel donde las coalicio-
nes implicadas en el mecanismo de objeción están restringidas, como en Grodal
(1972), a aquellas arbitrariamente pequeñas formadas por agentes “parecidos”.
Esto es, agentes que pertenecen a entornos de, como mucho, ￿ + 1 puntos en
el espacio de las características de los consumidores (dotaciones y preferencias),
siendo ￿ el número de mercancías. El trabajo de Vind (1972) nos llevó un paso
más allá para probar que es suficiente considerar coaliciones de cualquier me-
dida fija en las contra-objeciones, cuando las objeciones están restringidas à la
Grodal. Este resultado se puede interpretar en términos de proposiciones par-
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lamentarias: una minoría puede objetar una propuesta y, en un mecanismo de
voto, la contra-objeción se puede restringir a una mayoría cualificada. En estas
caracterizaciones, las restricciones sobre las coaliciones disponibles en el proceso
de constitución del bargaining set son más fuertes que en el trabajo de Schjødt
y Sloth (1994) y, por lo tanto, algunos de sus resultados se pueden obtener como
casos particulares.
Seguidamente nos centramos en el trabajo de Hervés-Beloso y Moreno-García
(2008), que proporcionaron una nueva caracterización del núcleo reforzando el
poder de veto de la gran coalición, formada por todos los agentes de la economía.
Utilizando este enfoque, demostramos que una objeción no tiene contra-objeción
si y solo si la asignación implicada en la objeción es “robustamente eficiente.”
La última sección del primer capítulo contiene dos ejemplos que ponen de
manifiesto los problemas que surgen al tratar de extender nuestros resultados y
que ilustran las principales diferencias entre ambas definiciones de bargaining set.
El primero considera una economía continua con dos agentes y dos mercancías
para mostrar que los resultados obtenidos para el global bargaining set no se
pueden aplicar al local bargaining set. En concreto, probamos que si se eliminan
las coaliciones de una medida precisa, el local bargaining set cambia. El segundo
ejemplo pone de manifiesto la imposibilidad de generalizar nuestros resultados a
un marco de dimensión infinita sin hipótesis adicionales.
El tema central de los capítulos 2 y 3 es también el bargaining set, en este caso
en economías de intercambio puro con un número finito de agentes, donde el con-
junto de asignaciones Walrasianas es un subconjunto estricto del núcleo, que está,
a su vez, estrictamente contenido en el bargaining set. El teorema de equivalen-
cia core-Walras de Aumann (1964) y el anteriormente mencionado de Mas-Colell
(1989) sugieren plantearse si es posible un resultado análogo en economías con
un número grande, aunque finito, de agentes. Una contribución clásica en este
sentido es el trabajo de Debreu y Scarf (1963), quienes enunciaron una primera
formalización de la conjetura de Edgeworth (1881), mostrando que el núcleo de
una economía replicada converge al conjunto de las asignaciones Walrasianas.
Sin embargo, aunque el trabajo de Debreu y Scarf sugiera la posibilidad de un
resultado análogo para bargaining sets, el trabajo de Anderson, Trockel y Zhou
(1997) (ATZ en lo sucesivo) demuestra que el bargaining set de Mas-Colell no
converge al conjunto de asignaciones Walrasianas en una sucesión de economías
replicadas como sí lo hace el núcleo. A grandes rasgos, podemos decir que la
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imposibilidad del resultado de convergencia para el bargaining set de Mas-Colell
se debe al hecho de que la noción de objeción creíble o justificada es muy exigen-
te, lo que hace que el bargaining set pueda llegar a ser muy grande. El ejemplo
de ATZ enfatiza este punto: se define una sucesión de economías réplica con un
único equilibrio Walrasiano, donde la medida del conjunto de asignaciones que
son individualmente racionales, óptimos de Pareto y de igual tratamiento, y que
no están en el bargaining set de Mas-Colell, converge a cero. No obstante, como
se señala en el trabajo de ATZ, el razonamiento que subyace en su ejemplo de
no convergencia depende crucialmente del uso de la estructura de las economías
replicadas. Consecuentemente, dejan abierta la posibilidad de que una forma al-
ternativa de aumentar el número de agentes en la economía, que implique un
aumento del poder de veto de las coaliciones, pudiera llevar a otros resultados.
En lugar de tomar como punto de partida la equivalencia core-Walras de
Aumann, en este trabajo empezamos a construir a partir del resultado de con-
vergencia de Debreu y Scarf y la noción de equilibrio de Edgeworth que Aubin
(1979) convirtió en un mecanismo de veto en el cual los agentes pueden participar
en las coaliciones con una parte o fracción de sus recursos, para probar que el
núcleo resultante coincide con el conjunto de asignaciones Walrasianas. El meca-
nismo de veto à la Aubin es una manera de aumentar el conjunto de coaliciones
posibles, y además, el resultado de Aubin, al que nos referimos como equivalencia
Aubin core-Walras, induce a considerar el veto de Aubin para definir objeciones
y contra-objeciones.
Es por esto que definimos un concepto de bargaining set para economías fini-
tas que implica un mayor número no solo de posibles objeciones, sino también de
contra-objeciones. Nótese que aumentar el número de coaliciones de esta manera
puede ser un arma de doble filo: el hecho de que haya más coaliciones repercu-
te en que hay más posibilidades para objetar, pero, al mismo tiempo, produce
más maneras de contra-objetar. En otras palabras, objetar se vuelve más fácil,
pero conseguir una objeción justificada, creíble o estable, es más difícil. En con-
secuencia, el efecto global producto de aumentar el número de coaliciones no es
trivial.
Es importante subrayar que, aunque podría parecer que esta noción de bar-
gaining set no es más que la de Mas-Colell aplicada al caso particular de una
economía continua de n tipos, pondremos de relieve que no es así y que hay dife-
rencias conceptuales entre ambas nociones con implicaciones importantes acerca
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de la naturaleza de las objeciones justificadas.
Una vez definido el concepto de Aubin bargaining set, demostramos que este
coincide con el conjunto de asignaciones Walrasianas, lo que proporciona una
versión finita de la caracterización obtenida por Mas-Colell (1989) para las asig-
naciones competitivas. Esta equivalencia Walras-bargaining nos permite deducir
que el bargaining set así definido es también consistente en el sentido de Dutta et
al. (1989), como ocurre con el de Mas-Colell para economías continuas. Además,
presentamos una versión finita de la caracterización de objeciones justificadas
mediante las llamadas objeciones Walrasianas (Mas-Colell, 1989), lo que refleja,
a su vez, las diferencias entre el concepto de Mas-Colell y el nuestro. Por otro
lado, dado que toda objeción Walrasiana es justificada y viceversa, podemos re-
finar nuestra equivalencia Walras-bargaining y su demostración en términos de
objeciones Walrasianas.
Nuestro resultado (y el de Mas-Colell) requiere implícitamente la formación
de todas las coaliciones posibles, tanto en el proceso de objeción como en el de
contra-objeción. Como se argumentó anteriormente, no parece razonable suponer
que los costes de formación de todas las coaliciones sean despreciables, y por
ello, también en este caso, analizamos la posibilidad de restringir la formación
de coaliciones. Las restricciones en este sentido consisten en que no todos los
parámetros, que especifican el grado de participación de los agentes cuando se
convierten en miembros de una coalición, sean admisibles. Demostramos que,
tanto para objeciones como para contra-objeciones, los ratios de participación de
los agentes se pueden restringir a aquellos arbitrariamente pequeños sin que el
bargaining set cambie. Por contra, mostramos que, al contrario de lo que ocurre
con el núcleo, no se tiene la equivalencia si solo se permiten parámetros cercanos
a la participación completa. También se prueba que los ratios de participación
para las contra-objeciones pueden restringirse a números racionales, lo que nos
llevará a analizar propiedades de convergencia del bargaining set, que constituyen
un parte fundamental de este trabajo.
En efecto, el concepto de Aubin bargaining set se puede reescribir en térmi-
nos de economías réplica permitiendo solo números racionales como parámetros
de participación, resultando en lo que hemos denominado Edgeworth bargaining
set, que tiene en cuenta la estructura de economías replicadas y no solamente lo
que ocurre en cada réplica. De hecho, volviendo al resultado de ATZ, mostramos
cómo su contraejemplo no prueba la no convergencia en el caso del Edgeworth
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bargaining set y, al mismo tiempo, este análisis proporciona una prueba alterna-
tiva y más simple del resultado de ATZ.
Presentamos a continuación un ejemplo que demuestra la imposibilidad de
obtener un resultado de convergencia exacto para el Edgeworth bargaining set.
El ejemplo indica no solo el motivo por el cual no es posible dicho resultado, sino
también las condiciones que permitirían conseguirlo. Así, suponiendo propiedades
de continuidad de la correspondencia de equilibrio, lo que ocurre genéricamente,
presentamos un resultado de convergencia para el Edgeworth bargaining set. Por
último, incorporando la noción de líder en el mecanismo de la objeción, probamos
que el Edgeworth bargaining set con líder converge al conjunto de asignaciones
Walrasianas sin necesidad de requerir hipótesis de continuidad.
El cuarto capítulo lo conforma un trabajo en el que se analiza un juego con
información incompleta donde las empresas compiten en precios. En el mode-
lo, las oportunidades estratégicas que determinan el poder de mercado no se ven
afectadas solamente por los precios, sino también por ciertos atributos de las em-
presas para atraer o captar consumidores, lo que produce funciones de demanda
residual continuas. Usaremos el término “estabilidad” para referirnos a este tipo
de competencia continua o “suave”. Por tanto, este capítulo es una contribución
a la literatura de competencia en precios, que se remonta al modelo clásico de
Bertrand, el cual originó numerosos estudios con distintas hipótesis respecto a
las características básicas de la competencia.
En este escenario de comportamientos estratégicos en precios, las formulacio-
nes de las funciones de demanda a las que se enfrentan las empresas juegan un
papel clave. Distintas formas de definir estas demandas residuales conducen a
diferentes juegos con variedad de nociones de equilibrio y un amplio abanico de
resultados. Por ejemplo, la demanda que absorbe cada empresa puede depender
de la información de los consumidores. Este es el caso de los trabajos de Salop y
Stiglitz (1977) y Varian (1980), que consideraron solo dos tipos de consumidores,
informados y desinformados. Otros trabajos usan teoría de search para tratar el
problema (véase, por ejemplo, Stahl, 1989, Janssen y Moraga-González, 2004, o
Janssen, Moraga-González y Wildenbeest, 2005).
La mayoría de estos modelos, donde las empresas eligen los precios y las de-
mandas que absorben dependen de la proporción entre consumidores informados
y no informados, carecen de estabilidad en la competencia debido a disconti-
nuidades en las demandas. En este trabajo consideramos un mercado donde ni
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todos los consumidores informados eligen necesariamente la empresa que practica
el precio más bajo, ni todos los consumidores desinformados eligen una empresa
de forma aleatoria entre todas aquellas que ofrezcan un precio menor o igual a su
precio de reserva. Como ya puntualizó Hotelling (1929), no es fácil argumentar
que pequeñas variaciones en los precios conduzcan a grandes cambios en las fun-
ciones de demanda: si un vendedor aumenta el precio de un bien de forma gradual
mientras sus competidores mantienen sus precios fijos, sus ventas disminuirán de
manera continua en lugar de caer de forma brusca. Esta línea de razonamiento
es la que nos lleva al análisis de la competencia estable.
En nuestro modelo, dicha estabilidad aparece como resultado de incorporar
una variable en las funciones de demanda residual a la que nos referimos como
el “tipo” de la empresa, lo cual permitirá cambios graduales de consumidores de
una empresa a otra cuando estos perciban diferencias en el precio del bien de
consumo. Esta variable representa ciertos atributos de las empresas que pueden
ser percibidos de manera diferente por cada consumidor, y que pueden recoger
características muy diversas, como una buena reputación, vendedores amables,
o algo tan sencillo como tener calefacción en invierno o aire acondicionado en
verano. En general, el tipo de cada empresa captura la habilidad que tiene esta
empresa a la hora de atraer clientes, y va en la línea de Hotelling (1929), que
ya mencionaba que algunos consumidores compran bienes en un sitio o en otro,
a pesar de que existan pequeñas diferencias en el precio. Por otra parte, estas
habilidades de las empresas no tienen por qué ser necesariamente conocidas y,
por ello, presentaremos un juego con información incompleta en la variable tipo
donde las empresas compiten en precios de manera estable.
En el modelo, las funciones de beneficio de cada empresa dependen de los pre-
cios elegidos por todas las empresas y de todos sus tipos. Cabe insistir en que,
en nuestro modelo, esta variable tipo no es una estrategia para las empresas. De
este modo, el juego presenta una estructura de información exógena que es una
distribución de probabilidad sobre el conjunto de tipos y que las empresas cono-
cen. Cuando esta distribución de probabilidad es degenerada, nos encontraremos
en un escenario de información completa.
Bajo hipótesis estándar, probamos existencia de equilibrio en estrategias dis-
tribucionales. Demostramos también que existe equilibrio aproximado en estra-
tegias puras para este juego. Es importante subrayar que, en un marco de in-
formación incompleta, una estrategia pura de una empresa es una función que
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asigna un precio a cada tipo. Ilustramos esto con un juego cuyas funciones de
demanda son lineales en precios.
El modelo que consideramos admite diferentes especificaciones de la estructura
de información y de las funciones de demanda, lo que a su vez conduce a juegos
diversos que explican distintas situaciones, siempre en un entorno de competencia
en precios con estabilidad. Primero, utilizando funciones de demanda lineales en
precios, y en un contexto de información incompleta, observamos que el fenómeno
de dispersión de precios aparece como un equilibrio en estrategias puras, en
contraste con otros análisis que explican este fenómeno mediante un equilibrio en
estrategias mixtas (véase Varian, 1980). Después, analizamos cómo el escenario de
información incompleta puede dar ventaja a algunas empresas sobre la situación
de información completa, mostrando que en los equilibrios del juego anterior
los beneficios esperados de una empresa son más altos con incertidumbre en
su tipo que en el caso de información completa. Surgen, pues, posibilidades de
que las empresas tengan diferentes políticas de publicidad: unas podrían preferir
anunciarse de manera que su tipo se convierta en información pública o, por el
contrario, elegir una alternativa publicitaria que mantenga su tipo “oculto”.
A continuación utilizamos una especificación de las demandas residuales que
separa el efecto producido por los precios del efecto producido por los tipos y
analizamos un juego que no solamente proporciona una solución alternativa a la
paradoja de Bertrand, sino que también muestra que su equilibrio resulta en una
situación de competencia monopolística, en concordancia con Chamberlin (1933,
1937), cuando el número de empresas aumenta.
Finalmente, observamos que algunos consumidores eligen a veces una cierta
tienda aun siendo conscientes de que el precio del bien es algo mayor que en
otra. En este caso, argumentamos que la variable tipo tiene casi todo el efecto
en la distribución de la demanda. En otras palabras, el tipo se convierte en la
variable relevante cuando los precios están suficientemente próximos. En cambio,
cuando las diferencias entre los precios son arbitrariamente grandes, el efecto de
la variable tipo se vuelve despreciable y la empresa que practique el precio más
bajo absorberá toda la demanda. De nuevo, esto tiene lugar de forma continua,
manteniendo la estabilidad en la competencia, lo que también nos permite una
mejor explicación del grado de dispersión de precios.
Abstract
This Ph.D. thesis consists of four main chapters. In the first one, we analyze
the behavior of bargaining sets in continuum economies when there are restric-
tions on the formation of coalitions, providing several characterizations of Vind’s
(1992) bargaining set in terms of its restricted versions, where not all the coali-
tions are formed. Moreover, we show that these equivalences do not hold for
Mas-Colell’s (1989) bargaining set. These findings highlight the diﬀerent nature
of both notions of bargaining sets. Finally, we illustrate the impossibility of
extrapolating our results to a more general setting.
The framework of the second chapter is a finite pure exchange economy, where
we define a bargaining set using Aubin’s veto mechanism and show its coincidence
with the set of Walrasian allocations which provides a discrete approach to the
characterization obtained by Mas-Colell (1989) for continuum economies. A
characterization of justified objections as Walrasian objections is obtained, and
we also elaborate on the possibility of restricting the formation of coalitions and
still get the bargaining set.
The third chapter is devoted to an analysis of the convergence of the bargain-
ing set in a sequence of replicated economies. Thus, we define the Edgeworth
bargaining set, making use of the whole structure of the replicated economy,
and we show that, in contrast with Anderson, Trockel and Zhou’s (1997) non-
convergence result, this Edgeworth bargaining set shrinks to the set of Walrarian
allocations.
A fourth and final chapter explores the stability in price competition by defin-
ing a game with incomplete information where firms compete in prices. The de-
mand functions faced by the firms depend on the prices and on the “types” of all
the firms. The variable “type” reflects the ability of firms to attract consumers
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and produces continuous demand functions, leading to stability in competition.
In addition, we consider that the information about types is not complete and
therefore there is uncertainty on the residual demands. We show existence of
equilibrium in distributional strategies and existence of approximate equilibria
in pure strategies. Then, we analyze diﬀerent specifications of the demands and
the information structure which yield further results and interpretations, provid-
ing new insights to the phenomenon of price dispersion, Bertrand’s paradox and
monopolistic competition.
Chapter 1
Bargaining sets in atomless
economies
1.1 Introduction
The core of an economy is defined as the set of feasible allocations that cannot
be blocked by any coalition. Nevertheless, the veto mechanism that defines the
core is based on a single move without taking into account possible consequences
the blocking may have. For instance, one may ask whether this veto is credible
or, on the contrary, not consistent enough so other agents in the economy may
react to it and propose alternative allocations. The consideration of a counter-
objection scheme reflects a more forward-looking behavior of traders. The first
formulation of this two-step conception of the veto mechanism was the work by
Aumann and Maschler (1964) who introduced the notion of bargaining set in a
game theory framework. The central idea underlying this concept is to try to
inject a sense of stability and credibility to the veto mechanism. Only objections
which have no counter-objections are considered credible or justified. Thus, the
implicit assumption in the core notion that individuals are not forward-looking
is overcome.
Mas-Colell (1989) adapted the concept of bargaining set to atomless economies
showing, under conditions of generality similar to the Core-Walras equivalence
theorem (Aumann, 1964), that the bargaining set and the competitive allocations
coincide. Vind (1992) proposed an alternative definition, resulting in a bargain-
ing set strictly larger than the core. The main diﬀerence between both concepts
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is the fact that Vind’s definition requires the allocations involved in objections
and counter-objections to be feasible for the set of all consumers, whereas in
Mas-Colell’s, such allocations only need to be attainable for the corresponding
coalitions. We follow the terminology for both concepts used in Schjødt and Sloth
(1994), so, from now on, we refer to Vind’s bargaining set as global bargaining
set and local bargaining set to Mas-Colell’s.
The objection and counter-objection process requires the formation of all
coalitions. However, in economies with many agents, or more precisely, with
a continuum of agents it is unlikely that all coalitions are costless to form. In
this line, Schmeidler (1972) argued that the measure of a coalition can be taken
as the amount of (or cost of) information and communication needed in order to
form that coalition. Consequently, it could be diﬃcult that the veto mechanism
works freely and spontaneously. Therefore, we consider that not all the coali-
tions are able to be formed and analyze the bargaining sets resulting from such
restrictions.
Our attempt to restrict the coalition formation underlying cooperative solu-
tions is not new. The remarks by Schmeidler (1972), Grodal (1972) and Vind
(1972) on the core of atomless economies showed that not all the possible coali-
tions have to be considered in order to block any non-competitive allocation.
These characterizations of the core encourage the application of analogous ideas
to the case of bargaining sets. After all, restrictions on admissible coalitions
become more appealing if the veto mechanism is fortified by forward-looking
moves. In this spirit, Schjødt and Sloth (1994) showed that if one restricts the
coalitions that can enter into the objection and counter-objection mechanism
to those whose measure is arbitrarily small, then the Mas-Colell bargaining set
becomes strictly larger than the original one, whereas the corresponding Vind
bargaining set remains unaltered.
Following this train of thought, we present a further study on the bargain-
ing set in continuum economies when restrictions on the coalitions involved are
applied, considering both definitions by Mas-Colell and by Vind. Our findings
are twofold: we obtain characterizations for the global bargaining set in terms of
a restricted objection and counter-objection process, and we provide examples
showing the diﬀerence between Vind’s and Mas-Colell’s bargaining sets that also
set boundaries for the possibility of generalizing our equivalence results.
First, we extend the result by Schjødt and Sloth (1994) showing that the
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global bargaining set is equivalent to the one where the objection mechanism
is restricted to Grodal-type coalitions. That is, the arbitrarily small coalitions
formed by agents that belong, as in Grodal’s (1972) remark on the core, to
neighborhoods of, at most, ￿+1 points in the space of consumers’ characteristics
(endowments and preferences), where ￿ is the number of commodities. Vind’s
(1972) work leads us to go beyond and prove that it is enough to consider coali-
tions of any fixed measure in the counter-objection process when the objection
is à la Grodal. We interpret this result in terms of parliamentary propositions: a
minority is allowed to object a proposal and the counter-objection process is re-
stricted to a qualified majority in a voting mechanism. In these characterizations
the restrictions on the coalitions that are formed in the bargaining process are
stronger than in Schjødt and Sloth (1994) and, therefore, some of their results
can be obtained as particular cases.
Next, we focus on the work by Hervés-Beloso and Moreno-García (2008), who
provided a new characterization of competitive allocations, and hence of the
core, by strengthening the veto power of the grand coalition, formed by all the
agents in the economy. Following their approach, we prove that an objection
has no counter-objection if and only if the allocation involved in the objection is
robustly eﬃcient.1
Last section contains two examples highlighting the problems we face when
trying to extend our results and illustrating the diﬀerences between both defini-
tions of bargaining set. The first example considers a continuum economy with
two types of agents and two commodities, to show that the results obtained pre-
viously for the global bargaining set do not apply for the local bargaining set.
More precisely, it shows that if we eliminate the coalitions of a precise measure,
the local bargaining set changes. The second example shows the impossibility of
generalizing our results to an infinite dimensional framework without introducing
additional assumptions.
1A feasible allocation is said to be robustly eﬃcient in an economy if it is not blocked by
the grand coalition in a collection of economies obtained by perturbing the initial endowments.
See Hervés-Beloso and Moreno-García (2008) for further details.
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1.2 The economy, notations and definitions
Let E be an exchange economy with a continuum of traders represented by the
finite measure space (I,A, µ), where I = [0, 1] is the set of agents, A is the
Lebesgue σ-algebra on I and µ is the Lebesgue measure on A.
There is a finite number ￿ of commodities and therefore IR￿ is the commodity
space. Each agent t is characterized by her consumption set IR￿+, her endowments
ω(t) ∈ IR￿+ and a preference relation ￿t over the consumption set. As in Aumann
(1964), we assume that the mapping that associates to each agent her preference
relation and endowments is measurable, that
￿
I ω(t)dµ(t) ￿ 0 and that every
preference relation ￿t is continuous and strictly monotone. Note that this im-
plies that each preference relation ￿t is represented by a continuous and strictly
increasing utility function Ut : IR￿+ → IR+.
A coalition S is a measurable set of consumers such that µ(S) > 0. An al-
location f : S → IR￿+ is said to be attainable or feasible for the coalition S if￿
S f(t)dµ(t) ≤
￿
S ω(t)dµ(t). The set of feasible allocations in the economy E is
the set of allocations that are attainable for the grand coalition I.
A coalition S blocks (weakly) or improves upon an allocation f if there exists
g which is an attainable allocation for S such that g(t) ￿t f(t) for every t ∈ S
with strict preference for every member in a subcoalition A ⊂ S with µ(A) > 0.
If it is the case, we say that f is weakly blocked by the coalition S via g. We
remark that under continuity and strict monotonicity of preferences the weak
and strong veto are equivalent.2 The core of the economy E , that we denote
by C(E), is the set of feasible allocations that cannot be improved upon by any
coalition. That is, a feasible allocation is in the core if there is no coalition which
can redistribute its total endowments in such a way that every member becomes
better oﬀ.
Thus, the core is defined considering the veto power of any coalition. However,
one might argue that even though an assignment could be blocked (or objected)
by a coalition, this would only occur if the blocking allocation cannot be “re-
blocked” (or counter-objected), that is, no other coalition can propose another
redistribution of resources which makes its members better oﬀ. To capture this
idea, the bargaining set notion introduced by Aumann and Maschler (1964) for
2An allocation f is strongly blocked by the coalition S if there is an attainable allocation g
for S such that g(t) ￿t f(t) for every t ∈ S.
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cooperative games has been adapted to atomless economies by Mas-Colell (1989)
and Vind (1992) resulting in two diﬀerent definitions of bargaining set. As we
have already stated in the Introduction, Mas-Colell’s will be referred to as “local
bargaining set”, whereas Vind’s will be named “global bargaining set”. To un-
derstand the similarities and diﬀerences between these concepts, let us now state
both definitions.
Local Bargaining Set. The bargaining set introduced by Mas-Colell (1989)
contains all the feasible allocations of the economy which, if (local) objected,
they could also be (local) counter-objected. The definition of local objection and
local counter-objection is as follows:
A local objection to the allocation f in the economy E is a pair (S, y), where
y is an attainable allocation for the coalition S, such that y(t) ￿t f(t) for every
t ∈ S and µ ({t ∈ S|y(t) ￿t f(t)}) > 0.
A local counter-objection to the objection (S, y) is a pair (T, z), where z is an
attainable allocation for the coalition T, such that z(t) ￿t y(t) for every t ∈ T ∩S
and z(t) ￿t f(t) for every t ∈ T \ S.
Note that no relation is required between the coalition that objects an allo-
cation and the coalition that counter-objects. In particular, T ∩ S may be even
empty. This point is not essential for Mas-Colell’s (1989) equivalence theorem,
nor for our results. What is more important is that the weak veto is the one
considered in order to object. In fact, we cannot strengthen the concept of objec-
tion by requiring that every member belonging to the blocking coalition strictly
improves with respect to the proposed allocation, as it was pointed out by Mas-
Colell using a continuum economy with a finite number of types of agents (see
Remark 5 in Mas-Colell, 1989). In contrast, because of continuity and strict
monotonicity of preferences, the counter-objection system can be weakened to
just requiring that a positive subset of the counter-objecting coalition becomes
strictly better oﬀ (see Remark 1 in Mas-Colell, 1989).
Global Bargaining Set. The bargaining set introduced by Vind (1992) contains
all the feasible allocations of the economy which, if (global) objected, they could
also be (global) counter-objected. The definition of global objection and global
counter-objection is as follows:
A global objection to the allocation f in the economy E is a pair (S, y), where
y is a feasible allocation which is also attainable for the coalition S, such that
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y(t) ￿t f(t) for every t ∈ S and µ ({t ∈ S|y(t) ￿t f(t)}) > 0.
Note that if (S, y) is a global objection to f then (S, y|S) is a local objection
to f, where y|S is the restriction of the feasible allocation y to S.
A global counter-objection to the global objection (S, y) is another pair (T, z),
where z is an attainable allocation for the coalition T and z(t) ￿t y(t) for every
t ∈ T.
We emphasize that in the global bargaining set, the allocations in the objection
mechanism are required to be not only attainable for the corresponding coalitions
but also feasible in the economy. This implies that the involved allocations specify
a commodity bundle for every agent, whereas in the local bargaining set they
are only defined on the coalitions implicated in the blocking scheme. Thus, any
coalition that proposes a global counter-objection is blocking a feasible allocation
(the one defined by the global objection) but their members are not necessarily
better oﬀ than in the objected allocation. This is in contrast to the local counter-
objection system and marks an important distinction between both concepts of
bargaining set which leads to diﬀerent robustness properties.
Let B(E) denote the local bargaining set and B∗(E) the global bargaining set
for the economy E . It is easy to see that B(E) and B∗(E) contain the core and
hence the competitive allocations of the economy E . The main result in Mas-
Colell (1989) is that in atomless economies the converse is also true, namely, the
local bargaining set characterizes the core. In other words, if only local objections
which are not counter-objected are allowed, the bargaining process is equivalent
to the veto mechanism, that is, the local bargaining set and the core (or the set of
competitive allocations) coincide. This is not the case for the global bargaining
set which in general is larger than the core.
1.3 Restricted bargaining sets
Eight years after the publication of Aumann’s (1964) core equivalence, Schmei-
dler (1972) showed that in an atomless economy with finitely many commodities,
any allocation that is not blocked by arbitrarily small coalitions is in the core.3
In the same issue of Econometrica, Grodal (1972) showed that in order to get
3Schmeidler proved that if an allocation f is blocked by a coalition S via an allocation g,
then, for any ε > 0, f is also blocked via the same allocation g by a coalition S￿ ⊂ S, with
µ(S￿) ≤ ε.
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the core we can further restrict the set of coalitions to those which are the union
of at most ￿ + 1 groups, each of which has not only measure but also diame-
ter arbitrarily small. Moreover, Vind (1972) showed a third consecutive remark
which states that in order to block any non-competitive allocation it is enough
to consider the veto power of arbitrarily large coalitions.
On the other hand, Hervés-Beloso and Moreno-García (2008) provided a new
characterization of competitive equilibrium based on the veto mechanism. They
showed that, in pure exchange economies with a continuum of non-atomic agents
and a finite number of commodities, the competitive allocations, and hence the
core, can be characterized by strengthening the veto power of the grand coalition,
formed by all the agents in the economy. This is done by slightly perturbing the
endowments of agents belonging to either arbitrarily small coalitions, arbitrarily
large coalitions or coalitions of a given measure.
These core characterizations for continuum economies allow us to obtain dif-
ferent equivalence results for the global bargaining sets in terms of a restricted
objection and counter-objection process. In this section, each main result is
preceded by a lemma stating the corresponding restriction on the formation
of coalitions to either object or counter-object in the bargaining mechanism.
Although the lemmas can be obtained as consequences of the underlying core
characterizations for atomless economies, we provide totally constructive proofs
(see Appendix) not only for the sake of completeness but also because the con-
struction of the allocation which defines the objection or counter-objection for
coalitions helps to a better understanding of our results.
Schjødt and Sloth (1994) showed that the global bargaining set remains un-
altered if only coalitions with small measure are entitled to raise an objection
or counter-objection. We remark that a small coalition can be formed by agents
with very dissimilar characteristics, and one may argue that the lack of commu-
nication (or cost of) restricts the set of coalitions that can be formed to those
that are a finite union of groups of agents with similar characteristics. That a
group of agents has small diameter essentially means that their members have
similar characteristics.4 Next we show that the global bargaining set is still the
same with this additional restriction on the coalition formation. To this end,
4This is because the mapping that associates each agent to her preference relation and
initial endowments is measurable. Thus, given ε > 0, Lusin’s theorem guarantees the existence
of a compact set of measure greater than 1− ε where this mapping is continous.
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given ε > 0 let us consider the following set of coalitions
Sε =
￿
S ⊂ I, such that S = ∪￿+1i=1Si with diam(Si) ≤ ε and µ(Si) ≤ ε
￿
.
Let B∗ε (E) denote the global bargaining set where coalitions (for both object-
ing and counter-objecting) are restricted to those in Sε. That is, coalitions are
restricted in such a way that their cost of join together and object or counter-
object an allocation is low.
Lemma 1.3.1. Let f be an allocation in an atomless economy E and (S, g) a
global objection to f . Let (T, h) be a counter-objection to (S, g). Then, for every
ε > 0, there exists H ∈ Sε that counter-objects (S, g) via the same h.
Proof. Since (T, h) is a counter-objection to (S, g) we have that h is a feasible
allocation, it is also attainable for T and every t ∈ T prefers h(t) rather than
g(t). By Lyapunov’s convexity theorem, for every ε > 0, there exists a coalition
Hε ⊂ T, such that h is attainable for Hε and then (Hε, h) is also a counter-
objection to (S, g) (see the proof in Schmeidler (1972) for further details).
As in Grodal (1972) let (tn, n ∈ IN) be a dense subset in Hε. Define H1ε =
Hε ∩ B(t1, ε/2) and Hnε = Hε ∩ B(tn, ε/2) \ ∪n−1k=1Hkε , for n > 1. Let hn =￿
Hnε
(h(t)− ω(t)) dµ(t). Define C as the convex hull of the set Γ = {hn|n ∈ N},
where N = {n ∈ IN|µ(Hnε ) > 0}. Now let χ be the smallest aﬃne subspace
containing C. Note that￿n∈N hn = 0 and 0 belongs to the interior of C relative to
χ ⊂ IR￿. By Caratheodory’s theorem, there is A ⊂ N with at most ￿+1 elements
such that we can write 0 =
￿
j∈A αjhj, with αj ∈ [0, 1] and
￿
j∈A αj = 1.
Lyapunov’s theorem allows us to guarantee that for each j ∈ A there exists Hj ⊂
Hjε such that µ(Hj) = αjµ(Hjε ) and
￿
Hj
(h(t)− ω(t)) dµ(t) = αjhj. Therefore, by
construction the coalition H = ∪j∈AHj belongs to Sε and counter-objects (S, g)
via h.
Q.E.D.
Theorem 1.3.1. For every ε, all the restricted global bargaining sets B∗ε (E) are
the same and coincide with the global bargaining set B∗(E).
Proof. Let us first prove that B∗(E) ⊂ B∗ε (E). Indeed, assume that f is a
feasible allocation such that f ∈ B∗(E) \ B∗ε (E). Since f /∈ B∗ε (E), there exists a
global objection (S, g) to f , with S ∈ Sε, for which there is no counter-objection
(C, y) such that C ∈ Sε, and by Lemma 1.3.1 this is the same as saying that
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it does not exist any counter-objection to (S, g). This means that f is global
objected but not counter-objected, so f /∈ B∗(E).
We will now prove that B∗ε (E) ⊂ B∗(E). Let f ∈ B∗ε (E), and let (S, g) be
a global objection to f . By Lyapunov’s and Caratheodory’s theorems (see the
proof of the Lemma 1.3.1) we can guarantee the existence of K ⊂ S such that
K ∈ Sε and
￿
K g(t)dµ(t) ≤
￿
K ω(t)dµ(t), meaning that (K, g) is also a global
objection to f . Since f ∈ B∗ε (E), (K, g) necessarily has a counter-objection
(C, y), with C ∈ Sε, which is straightforward also a counter-objection to (S, g),
concluding that f ∈ B∗(E).
Q.E.D.
Accepting that ε > 0 exists so that communication can take place within a
group of relatively few (measure less than ε) and similar (the diameter of the set
of members less than ε) agents, then, Theorem 1.3.1 shows that one just needs
communication between ￿ + 1 such groups of agents to eliminate any allocation
which is not in the global bargaining set.
Symmetrically to the characterization of Schmeidler and Grodal, large enough
coalitions are able to eliminate any allocation that does not belong to the core
(Vind, 1972). This leads us to prove a further result on restricted bargaining sets.
Next lemma shows that to counter-object it is enough to consider coalitions of
any fixed measure.
Lemma 1.3.2. Let f be an allocation in an atomless economy E and (S, g) a
global objection to f . Let (T, h) be a counter-objection to (S, g). Then, for
all α ∈ (0, 1), there exists a global counter-objection (C, y) to (S, g) such that
µ(C) = α.
Proof. Since (T, h) is a counter-objection to (S, g), the following holds:
(i)
￿
T h(t)dµ(t) ≤
￿
T ω(t)dµ(t) and
(ii) h(t) ￿t g(t) for almost all t ∈ T.
If α < µ(T ), consider the measure ν(A) =
￿
µ(A),
￿
A(h(t)− ω(t))dµ(t)
￿
re-
stricted to measurable subsets of the coalition T. By Lyapunov’s convexity the-
orem we obtain that there exists Tα ⊂ T, with µ(Tα) = α, that blocks the
allocation g via the same h.
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Consider α > µ(T ). Let the measure η(A) =
￿
µ(A),
￿
A(h(t)− g(t))dµ(t)
￿
restricted to subsets of T. Applying Lyapunov’s convexity theorem we obtain
that for any β ∈ (0, 1) there exits A ⊂ T such that µ(A) = βµ(T ) and ￿A(h(t)−
g(t))dµ(t) = β
￿
T (h(t) − g(t))dµ(t). By continuity and measurability, there exist
h˜ and δ > 0 such that
￿
A h˜(t)dµ(t) =
￿
A h(t)dµ(t) − δ and h˜(t) ￿ g(t) for every
t ∈ A.
Let the allocation z defined as follows:
z(t) =

h˜(t) if t ∈ A,
g(t) + δµ(T\A) if t ∈ T \ A.
Note that
￿
T z(t)dµ(t) =
￿
T (βh(t) + (1− β)g(t)) dµ(t) and z(t) ￿ g(t) for
every t ∈ T. As before, there exists γ > 0 and z˜ such that ￿T z˜(t)dµ(t) =￿
T z(t)dµ(t) − γ and z˜(t) ￿ g(t) for every t ∈ T. Applying Lyapunov’s theorem
again to the above measure ν restricted to I \ T, we have that there exists
B ⊂ I \ T such that µ(B) = (1 − β)µ(I \ T ) and ￿B (g(t)− ω(t)) dµ(t) = (1 −
β)
￿
I\T (g(t)− ω(t)) dµ(t).
The coalition C = T ∪ B blocks g via de allocation y given by
y(t) =

z˜(t) if t ∈ T,
g(t) + γµ(B) if t ∈ B and
ω(t) otherwise.
By construction y is a feasible allocation and
￿
C y(t)dµ(t) ≤
￿
C ω(t)dµ(t).
Taking β = (1− α)/(1− µ(T )), we conclude that µ(C) = α.
Q.E.D.
To state our second characterization in terms of a restricted bargaining mech-
anism, let α-B∗ε (E) be the restricted bargaining set which contains all the feasible
allocations of the economy that, if global objected by a coalition in Sε, they could
also be counter-objected by a coalition in Cα = {S ⊂ I, such that µ(S) = α}.
Theorem 1.3.2. α-B∗ε (E) = B∗(E) for every α, ε ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. We follow the same proof as in the previous theorem. To prove that
B∗(E) ⊂ α-B∗ε (E), we apply Lemma 1.3.2 instead of Lemma 1.3.1, and to show
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that α-B∗ε (E) ⊂ B∗(E) it is important to remark that if (S, g) is a global objection
to f, then there exists K ∈ Sε such that (K, g) is also a global objection to f.
That is, both coalitions S and K use the same feasible allocation g which is
crucial in the proof.
Q.E.D.
This theorem states that if objecting coalitions are restricted to those whose
formation cost is small, then the set of allocations arising from the bargaining
mechanism is the same if, in addition, the counter-objection process is restricted
to the set of coalitions of any fixed measure. An interpretation of the result
in terms of voting is the following: Assuming that a minority (ε -Grodal type
coalition) objects a proposition, and considering only counter-objections formed
by a qualified majority (measure α) of voters, the global bargaining set remains
the same. Or, in other words, the justified objections made by minorities are
those for which there is not a qualified majority of voters proposing a better
alternative.
In which follows we show that we can further restrict the coalitions that are
allowed to form in order to counter-object and still have the coincidence with the
global bargaining set. To be precise, we will only consider the counter-objecting
power of the grand coalition formed by all the agents, but exercised in a family
of economies obtained by perturbing the agents’ initial endowments. For this,
given an allocation f, a coalition A and a parameter α ∈ [0, 1], the continuum
economy E(A, f,α) is the same as E except for the endowments of the agents in
the coalition A that are the convex combination of f and ω defined by α, that
is, the endowments in this perturbed economy E(A, f,α) are the following:
ω(A, f,α)(t) =

ω(t) if t ∈ I \ A,
(1− α)ω(t) + αf(t) if t ∈ A.
As in Hervés-Beloso and Moreno-García (2008), we say that a feasible alloca-
tion f is robustly eﬃcient in the economy E if f is a non-dominated5 allocation
in every economy E(A, f,α). Thus, if (S, g) is a global objection, g is robustly
eﬃcient when the grand coalition I is not able to counter-object in any of the
perturbed economies E(A, g,α). Next lemma shows that in order to counter-
object any objection it is enough to consider the formation of the grand coalition
5An allocation h (feasible or not) is dominated (or blocked by the grand coalition) in an
economy if there exists a feasible allocation g in such an economy such that every consumer t
prefers g(t) rather than h(t).
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I whose veto power is exercised in a family of economies obtained by perturbing
the agents’ original endowments.
Lemma 1.3.3. Let (S, g) be a global objection to the feasible allocation f. (S, g)
has no counter-objection if and only if g is robustly eﬃcient.
Proof. Let (S, g) be a full objection to f. Since g has no counter-objection, g is in
the core. Let p a price system such that (p, g) is a competitive equilibrium for the
economy E . Suppose that there exist a coalition T and a number α ∈ (0, 1] such
that g is dominated in the economy E(T, g,α), that is, there exists an allocation h
which is feasible in the perturbed economy E(T, g,α) and h(t) ￿t g(t) for almost
all t ∈ I. Then, we have that p · h(t) > p · ω(t) ≥ p · g(t), for almost all agent
t ∈ I.
Multiplying the above inequalities by (1−α) and by α, respectively, we obtain
p · h(t) > p · ((1 − α) ω(t) + α g(t)) for almost all agent t ∈ T. Therefore, we
have
￿
I p · h(t) dµ(t) >
￿
I\T p · ω(t)dµ(t) +
￿
T p · ((1− α)ω(t) + αg(t)) dµ(t) =￿
I p · ω(T, g,α)(t) dµ(t), which is a contradiction with the feasibility of h in the
economy E(T, g,α).
To show the converse, let g a non-dominated allocation for every economy
E(A, g,α). Assume that (S, g) has a counter-objection, namely (T, z). Arguing as
in the proof of Lemma 1.3.2, we can take z such that
￿
T z(t)dµ(t) ≤
￿
T ω(t)dµ(t)−
δ, with δ > 0 and moreover, given any α ∈ (0, 1), there exists an allocation
y : T → IR￿+ such that
￿
T y(t)dµ(t) =
￿
T (αz(t)+(1−α)g(t))dµ(t) and y(t) ￿t f(t)
for every t ∈ T. Let us consider the allocation h : I → IR￿+ given by
h(t) =
 y(t) if t ∈ T andg(t) + αµ(I\T ) δ if t ∈ I \ T.
By construction, we can deduce
￿
I(h(t)−ω(I\T, g,α)(t))dµ(t) = (1−α)
￿
I(g(t)−
ω(t))dµ(t) ≤ 0. Therefore, the grand coalition blocks g via h in the economy
E(I \ T, g,α), which is a contradiction with the fact that g is a non dominated
allocation for every economy E(A, g,α).
Q.E.D.
Theorem 1.3.3. The global bargaining set B∗(E) coincides with the set of allo-
cations that are not global objected by any robustly eﬃcient allocation.
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1.4 Some examples
This section presents two diﬀerent examples that state limits on the extension
of the previous results.
The first example shows that, in contrast to the core, in order to get the the
local bargaining set, we cannot restrict the objecting coalition to the large ones.
Example 1.4.1. Let us consider an economy with two commodities, x and y, and
a continuum of agents represented by the unit real interval I = [0, 2], endowed
with the Lebesgue measure µ. Every consumer t ∈ I has the same preference
relation, represented by the utility function U(x, y) = xy. The endowments are
given by ω(t) = (3, 1) for every t ∈ I1 = [0, 1) and by ω(t) = (1, 3) for every
t ∈ I2 = [1, 2]. Let x be numeraire and let p denote the price of y. The unique
competitive equilibrium price is p∗ = 1 which leads to the equalitarian distribu-
tion of resources.
Given a coalition S, let E(S) denote the economy restricted to S and let
S1 = I1∩S and S2 = I2∩S. Consider the coalition S, with members of both types
(i.e., µ(S1) > 0 and µ(S2) > 0). The equilibrium price of E(S) is p(α) = 3α+1α+3 ,
where α = µ(S1)/µ(S2). Then, the competitive allocation c(α) of this restricted
economy assigns c1(α) =
￿
3α+5
α+3 ,
3α+5
3α+1
￿
to agents of type 1 (i.e., consumers in S1)
and c2(α) =
￿
5α+3
α+3 ,
5α+3
3α+1
￿
to agents of type 2 (i.e., consumers in S2). For each
α ∈ IR+, let Vi(α) = U(ci(α)), for i = 1, 2. The function V1(α) is decreasing and
convex whereas V2(α) is increasing and concave (see figure below). As shown by
Mas-Colell (1989, Propositions 1 and 3), a local objection is justified if and only
if it is a Walrasian objection6. A Walrasian objection constitutes, in particular,
a competitive allocation of the economy restricted to the objecting coalition.
However, note that an objection given by a coalition S and the competitive
allocation of E(S) is not necessarily a justified (or Walrasian) objection. Being a
Walrasian objection is much more demanding. In any case, in our economy, the
only potential justified objections with the participation of consumers of types 1
and 2 are those given by the parameter α as previously stated.
In addition, if a coalition S with participation of both types, objects an equal
treatment allocation f (that assigns fi to agents of type i) via g and (S, g)
6An objection (S, g) to f is said to be Walrasian if there exists a price system p such that
(i) p · v ≥ p · ω(t) if v ￿t g(t), t ∈ S and (ii) p · v ≥ p · ω(t) if v ￿t f(t), t /∈ S.
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is a justified objection then, under strict convexity of preferences, g is also an
equal treatment allocation that gives gi to agents in Si, i = 1, 2. Furthermore, if
agents of type i strictly prefer gi rather than fi, we have that µ(Si) = µ(Ii) and
if µ(Si) < µ(Ii), then gi = fi. (See Remark 5 in Mas-Colell, 1989). This means
that if (S, g) is a justified objection, then µ(S) > 1.
Let f be the following feasible allocation in the atomless economy E
f(t) =
 (
15
9 ,
23
11) if t ∈ [0, 1),
(219 ,
21
11) if t ∈ [1, 2].
We emphasize that f is not a competitive allocation in our economy and
assigns c2(α∗) to agents in I2, with α∗ = 3/2.Moreover, we find a unique positive
real number αˆ such that V1(αˆ) = U(f(t)) for every t ∈ I1.7 Since αˆ > α∗ and V1
is decreasing, we have that c1(α∗) is strictly preferred to f(t) = c1(αˆ) for every
t ∈ I1.
Therefore, since f is individually rational, the set of all potential justified ob-
jections is given by the interval [α∗, αˆ]. Let S be a coalition such that µ(S1)/µ(S2) =
α ∈ (α∗, αˆ) and consider the competitive allocation c(α) of E(S).We remark that
every member in S becomes better oﬀ with c(α) than with f. Then, (S, c(α)) is
an objection to f but it is not justified (otherwise S must be of full measure,
and α must be equal to 1).
We stress that, since α∗ > 1, the aforementioned remarks on justified objec-
tions allow us to conclude that if the objection given by α ∈ [α∗, αˆ] is justified
it has to verify that agents of type 1 become better oﬀ whereas agents of type 2
remain indiﬀerent with respect to f.
To be precise, note that c1(α∗) + 1α∗ c2(α
∗) = ω1 + 1α∗ω2. Then, any coalition
S such that µ(S1) = 1 and µ(S2) = 1/α∗, blocks f via the allocation that assigns
c1(α∗) to agents in S1 and c2(α∗) to agents in S2. Furthermore, these objections
are the unique Walrasian objections to f, equivalently, these are the unique local
objections to f with no counter-objection. We conclude that f belongs to the
bargaining set of our economy if the set of coalitions that objects is restricted in
such a way that does not include coalitions of measure 1 + 1α∗ .
7Some calculations show that αˆ =
√
115−5
3 .
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α∗αˆ
V
i
V1
V2
We emphasize that the example shows more than the impossibility of restrict-
ing to arbitrarily small or large coalitions in order to obtain a local justified
objection. It proves that the local bargaining set changes whenever we exclude
coalitions of size 1 + 1α∗ . Also, note that there is α˜ > α
∗ such that it suﬃces a
slight modification of the allocation f to show that the bargaining also changes if
we exclude coalitions of measure larger that 1+ 1α˜ . To show this, for each α > 1,
let h(α) = (4, 4) − c2(α) and consider the allocation fα which assigns h(α) to
every agent of type 1 and c2(α) to agents of type 2. Note that h(α) is at least as
preferred as the initial resources (3, 1) if and only if α ≤ α˜ = 41/17. Then, for
any α ∈ (1, α˜], the allocation fα is feasible and individually rational. Consider
a coalition Sα such that µ(Sα ∩ I1) = 1 and µ(Sα ∩ I2) = 1/α. We have that
(Sα, c(α)) is a justified objection to fα for each α ∈ (1, α˜]. Moreover, the unique
coalitions which define a justified objection to fα have measure 1+ 1α .We remark
that the bound α˜ depends basically on the endowments. Thus, a similar exam-
ple, changing the endowment allocation, would prove that we cannot exclude
coalitions of any measure.
Therefore, it is not possible to restrict coalitions in the objection process,
independently of the kind of restriction we consider. Thus, Theorem 3 in Schjødt
and Sloth (1994), can be obtained as a consequence of the previous example.
Next, we provide an example showing the impossibility of an extension of
the previous results to a infinite dimensional commodity space setting without
introducing additional assumptions.8
8We remark that Schmeidler’s (1972), Grodal’s (1972) and Vind’s (1972) characterizations
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Example 1.4.2. Consider a pure exchange economy with a continuum of agents,
represented by I = [0, 1]. The commodity space is ￿∞, the space of bounded
sequences.
For each n ∈ IN￿{0} let us consider a partition {I in, i = 1, . . . , 2n} of the
unit real interval I = [0, 1] given by I in =
￿
i−1
2n ,
i
2n
￿
for i = 1, . . . , 2n − 1 and
I2
n
n =
￿
2n−1
2n , 1
￿
. Now, let A be a measurable subset of I = [0, 1] such that 0 <
µ(A
￿
I in) < µ(I
i
n) for every n and every i and such that, for each n, µ(A
￿
I in) =
an for every i = 1, . . . , 2n.9
The mapping ω : I → ￿∞+ which associates to each agent t ∈ I her initial
endowment ω(t) = (ωj(t))∞j=1 is given by
ωj(t) =

1 if t /∈ A,
c(j) if t ∈ A￿ I in with j = 2n + i− 1,
0 otherwise,
where c(j) > 0 verifies that c(j) = cn if j = 2n + i− 1 for some i ∈ {1, . . . , 2n},
and cn converges to zero when n goes to ∞. This last property implies that ω is
bounded and Bochner integrable.
Preferences relations are given by the following utility functions:
Ut(x) = lim infj xj if t /∈ A, and
Ut(x) =
￿
j≥1 α(j) log(1 + xj) if t ∈ A
where α(j) > 0 verifies that α(j) = αn if j = 2n + i− 1 for some i ∈ {1, . . . , 2n},
and
￿
j≥1 α(j) <∞.
The coalition A blocks the initial allocation ω via the allocation x defined as
of the core for atomless economies rely crucially on Lyapunov’s convexity theorem which does
not hold in an infinite dimensional set up. In spite of this, under further assumptions, there are
extensions of these core characterizations to economies with an infinite dimensional commodity
space (see, for instance, Hervés-Beloso et al., 2000, Evren and Hüsseinov, 2008, and Pesce,
2010). Accordingly, the example we state is in connection with this analysis.
9For example, we can take a non-negligible Cantor subset A10 of I10 = I; then we take again
non-negligible Cantor subsets A11 and A21 of I11 \A10 and I21 \A10 respectively, with the property
that µ(A10
￿
I11 ) + µ(A
1
1) = µ(A
1
0
￿
I21 ) + µ(A
2
1); and so on. In this way, A =
￿∞
n=0
￿2n
i=1A
i
n
and, for any n we have that µ(A
￿
Iin) =
µ(A)
2n , for all i = 1, . . . , 2
n.
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follows:
x2(t) =
c(2) µ(A
￿
I11 )
µ(A)
,
x3(t) =
c(3) µ(A
￿
I21 )
µ(A)
and
xj(t) = ωj(t) if j ￿= 2, 3.
To show this, note that by construction µ(A
￿
I11 ) = µ(A
￿
I21 ) =
µ(A)
2
and
by definition c(2) = c(3) = c1. Therefore, x2(t) = x3(t) =
c1
2
.
On the other hand, since α(2) = α(3) = α1, we obtain that for every t ∈ A
the following inequality holds:
α(2) log(1 + x2(t)) + α(3) log(1 + x3(t)) = α1 log
￿
1 +
c1
2
￿2
>
> α1 log (1 + c1) = α(2) log(1 + ω2(t)) + α(3) log(1 + ω3(t)).
Then, x(t) ￿t ω(t) for every agent t belonging to the coalition A.
Finally, note that the following equalities hold:￿
A ω2(t)dµ(t) = c(2)µ(A
￿
I11 ) and￿
A ω3(t)dµ(t) = c(3)µ(A
￿
I21 ).
These equalities imply that
￿
A x(t)dµ(t) =
￿
A ω(t)dµ(t).
Therefore, the coalition A blocks ω via x. Furthermore, a similar argument
shows that, for any natural number n, the coalition A
￿￿
1
2 − 12n , 12 + 12n
￿
blocks
ω. Then, we conclude that ω is blocked by arbitrarily small coalitions.
However, if S is a coalition such that µ(S
￿
Ac) = µ(S
￿
(I \A)) > 0, then S
can no longer block ω. To show this point it suﬃces to notice that Ut(ω(t)) = 1
for every t /∈ A, and ￿S ωj(t)dµ(t) = c(j)µ(A￿ I in) + µ(S \A), where n and i are
such that j = 2n + i− 1 and 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n.
Therefore, we conclude that ω is blocked by the coalition A and, given ε <
µ(A), the initial allocation ω is also blocked by a coalition Aε, with µ(Aε) ≤ ε.
However, if ε > µ(A), there is no coalition S with µ(S) ≥ ε blocking ω. There-
fore, in this scenario, Vind’s (1972) theorem does not hold if preferences are
not Mackey continuous. We claim that we cannot either extend our results on
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bargaining sets to economies with an infinite number of commodities without in-
troducing new assumptions. To show our point, let us consider now the following
feasible allocation:
f(t) =

1
µ(I\A)
￿
A ω(t)dµ(t) if t ∈ I \ A,
(0, 0) if t ∈ A.
(A,ω) defines a global objection. The endowment allocation ω is obviously
feasible, attainable for the coalition A and A blocks f via ω. As we have shown,
A counter-objects the global objection (A,ω) via x. However, if S is a coalition
such that µ(S ∩ Ac) > 0, then S can no longer block ω and therefore cannot
counter-object (A,ω).
We remark that the utility function U(x) = lim infj xj is not weak star
continuous on ￿∞+ . To show it, let us consider the sequence xn given by (xn)j = 0
if j ≤ n and (xn)j = 1 if j > n. Then, xn converges to zero with respect to the
Mackey topology10 and hence with the weak star topology. However, note that
U(xn) = 1 for each n while U(0) = 0.
It is important to point out that weak star continuity of preferences leads to a
precise condition of the substitutability properties among commodities required
for perfect competition and is related to economic thickness of markets (see, for
instance, Ostroy and Zame, 1994).
We conclude that extensions of our results to more general settings, where
perfect competition is not guaranteed, require additional assumptions11.
1.5 Conclusions
We have analyzed the Mas-Colell’s and Vind’s definitions of bargaining set (lo-
cal and global bargaining set, respectively) in continuum economies. We have
provided several characterizations of the global bargaining set, each of which
comes from a diﬀerent restriction on the formation of the coalitions involved in
10Recall that the Mackey topology coincides with the weak star topology on bounded subsets
of ￿∞.
11This point is in accordance with the work by Hervés-Beloso et al., (2000), who have ex-
tended Schmeidler’s and Grodal’s results to an infinite dimensional setting by requiring a kind
of myopic behavior of the agents.
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the process. We also prove that we cannot eliminate the coalition of any size in
order to obtain the local bargaining set. Finally, we show that our equivalence
results do not hold in an infinite dimensional set up.
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Chapter 2
Bargaining sets in finite economies
2.1 Introduction
The core of an economy is defined as the set of allocations that cannot be blocked
by any coalition. Thus, the veto mechanism that defines the core implicitly
assumes that individuals are not forward-looking. However, one may ask whether
an objection or veto is credible or, on the contrary, not consistent enough so other
agents in the economy may react to it and propose an alternative or counter-
objection.
The first outcome of this two-step conception of the veto mechanism was the
work by Aumann and Maschler (1964) who introduced the concept of bargaining
set, containing the core of a cooperative game. This original concept of bargain-
ing set was adapted later to atomless economies by Mas-Colell (1989). The main
idea is to inject a sense of credibility and stability to the veto mechanism, and
hence permitting the implementation of some allocations that otherwise would
be formally blocked, although in a non-credible way. Thus, only objections with-
out counter-objections are considered as credible or justified, and consequently
blocking an allocation becomes more diﬃcult.
In the case of pure exchange economies with a finite number of traders the
set of Walrasian allocations is a strict subset of the core which is also strictly
contained in the bargaining set. Under conditions of generality similar to those
required in Aumann’s (1964) core-Walras equivalence theorem, Mas-Colell (1989)
showed that the bargaining set and the competitive allocations coincide for con-
tinuum economies. These equivalence results provide foundations for the Wal-
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rasian market equilibrium and, at the same time, arise the question of whether
there are analogies in economies with large, but a finite number of agents. A
classical contribution in this direction is the one by Debreu and Scarf (1963),
who stated a first formalization of Edgeworth’s (1881) conjecture, showing that
the core and the set of Walrasian allocations become arbitrarily close whenever
a finite economy is replicated suﬃciently many times. However, in contrast with
the Debreu-Scarf core convergence theorem, the work by Anderson, Trockel and
Zhou (1997), ATZ from now on, proved that the bargaining set does not shrink
to the set of Walrasian allocations in a sequence of replicated economies as the
core does.1
Therefore, unlike the core, the Mas-Colell bargaining set does not lead to a
convergence result in large finite economies. Roughly speaking, this is basically
due to the fact that the notion of a justified objection is very stringent. Thus,
given the diﬃculties to find such credible blocking, the bargaining set may be-
come very large. The example stated by ATZ highlights this point: they define
a sequence of replica economies in which there is a unique Walrasian equilibrium
but the bargaining set eventually occupies the full measure of the set of all in-
dividually rational and Pareto optimal allocations having the equal treatment
property. Nevertheless, as ATZ pointed out, the argument supporting their non-
convergence example depends crucially on the use of a replica structure to enlarge
the economy. Consequently, they leave open the possibility that other ways of
enlarging the set of agents, and in turn, strengthening the blocking power of
coalitions in the economy, might lead to other results.
Instead of starting from Aumann’s core-Walras equivalence, in this work we
build upon Debreu-Scarf’s core convergence and the Edgeworth equilibrium no-
tion that Aubin (1979) turned into his veto mechanism, where agents can par-
ticipate in coalitions with a part of their endowments, showing that the core
resulting from this blocking system equals the set of Walrasian allocations. The
veto mechanism à la Aubin represents actually a way of enlarging the set of
coalitions. Furthermore, the Aubin core-Walras equivalence leads us to consider
the Aubin veto to define objections and counter-objections. Thus, we define a
concept of bargaining set for finite economies that involves not only more pos-
sible objections but also counter-objections. Note that enlarging the number of
coalitions in this way may be a double-edged sword. Having more coalitions im-
1The replica sequence in the example stated by ATZ satisfies the hypotheses of the Debreu-
Scarf theorem (1963); preferences are smooth and the economy is regular.
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plies more possibilities to object but, at the same time, produces more ways of
counter-objecting. That is, objecting becomes easier but having a justified objec-
tion becomes harder. This highlights the fact that the overall eﬀect of enlarging
the number of coalitions is not straightforward.
It could appear that this notion is nothing but Mas-Colell’s for the particular
case of a n-types continuum economy, but it is not. There are actually conceptual
diﬀerences between both concepts with important implications regarding the
nature of justified objections.
Our first result states that set of Walrasian allocations coincides with this
Aubin bargaining set, providing a finite approach to the characterization ob-
tained by Mas-Colell (1989) of competitive allocations. Our Walras-bargaining
equivalence allows us to deduce that the bargaining set we have defined is also
consistent in the sense of Dutta et al. (1989) as it happens with the Mas-
Colell bargaining set for atomless economies. Furthermore, we also provide a
discrete approach to the characterization of justified objections stated by Mas-
Colell (1989) by means of a notion of Walrasian objections that reflects the main
diﬀerences between Mas-Colell’s bargaining set and ours. Having that any Wal-
rasian objection is justified and vice-versa for finite economies, allows us to refine
our Walras-bargaining equivalence and its proof in terms of Walrasian objections.
Our result (and also Mas-Colell’s) implicitly requires the formation of all
coalitions. In other words, the bargaining set concept demands to check the
whole set of possible coalitions in order to test whether any group of agents can
improve upon an allocation by using their own resources, both in the objection
and counter-objection process. It is usually argued that the costs arising from
forming a coalition are not at all negligible; incompatibilities among diﬀerent
agents may appear and a big amount of information and communication might
be needed to really get together a coalition. This idea leads us to study the
possibility of restricting the formation of coalitions by assuming that not all the
parameters, which specify the degree of participation of agents when they become
members of a coalition, are admissible. Then, we analyze the consequences that
this condition has with regard to the bargaining set solution. We show that
both for objections and counter-objections, the participation rates of the agents
can be restricted to those arbitrarily small without changing the bargaining set.
However, we show that this does not hold if we consider parameters close enough
to the complete participation. We also prove that the participation rates in the
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counter-objection system can be restricted to rational numbers, which leads us to
an analysis of the convergence properties of the bargaining set when the economy
is enlarged via replicas that constitutes a central point of this work.
Finally, we try to make the best use of our results by recasting in terms of
the bargaining set some characterizations of the Walrasian allocations already
present throughout the literature. First, we focus on a result by Hervés-Beloso,
Moreno-García and Yannelis (2005) that characterizes Walrasian allocations as
those that are not blocked by the coalition formed by all the agents in a collection
of perturbed economies. Then, we revisit the approach followed by Hervés-
Beloso and Moreno-García (2009) who showed that Walrasian equilibria can
be identified by using a non-cooperative two-player game. Both equivalence
theorems constitute now additional characterizations of the bargaining set for
finite economies.
2.2 Preliminaries
Let E be an exchange economy with a finite set of agents N = {1, . . . , n}, who
trade a finite number ￿ of commodities. Each consumer i has a preference relation
￿i on the set of consumption bundles IR￿+, with the properties of continuity,
convexity2 and strict monotonicity. This implies that preferences are represented
by utility functions Ui, i ∈ N. Let ωi ∈ IR￿++ denote the endowments of consumer
i. So the economy is E = (IR￿+,￿i,ωi, i ∈ N).
An allocation x is a consumption bundle xi ∈ IR￿+ for each agent i ∈ N.
The allocation x is feasible in the economy E if ￿ni=1 xi ≤ ￿ni=1 ωi. A price
system is an element of the (￿ − 1)-dimensional simplex of IR￿+. A Walrasian
equilibrium for the economy E is a pair (p, x), where p is a price system and x
is a feasible allocation such that, for every agent i, the bundle xi maximizes the
utility function Ui in the budget set Bi(p) = {y ∈ IR￿+ such that p · y ≤ p · ωi}.
We denote by W (E) the set of Walrasian allocations for the economy E .
A coalition is a non-empty set of consumers. An allocation y is said to be
attainable or feasible for the coalition S if
￿
i∈S yi ≤
￿
i∈S ωi. Let x ∈ IR￿n+ be
2The convexity of preferences we require is the following: If a consumption bundle z is
strictly preferred to zˆ so is the convex combination λz + (1 − λ)zˆ for any λ ∈ (0, 1). This
convexity property is weaker than strict convexity and it holds, for instance, when the utility
functions are concave.
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a feasible allocation in the economy E . The coalition S blocks x if there exists
an allocation y which is attainable for S, such that yi ￿i xi for every i ∈ S
and yj ￿j xj for some member j in S. A feasible allocation is eﬃcient if it is
not blocked by the grand coalition, formed by all the agents. The core of the
economy E , denoted by C(E), is the set of feasible allocations which are not
blocked by any coalition of agents.
It is known that, under the hypotheses above, the economy E has Walrasian
equilibrium and that any Walrasian allocation belongs to the core (in particular,
it is eﬃcient). Moreover, the blocking power of coalitions in finite economies is
not able to eliminate every non-Walrasian allocation. Then, in order to charac-
terize the Walrasian equilibria in terms of the core, we have to enlarge the set
of coalitions or, alternatively, increase somehow their veto power. This line of
arguments has been carried out following diﬀerent ways. For instance, Aubin
(1979) extended the notion of ordinary veto by allowing members to participate
with a portion of their endowments when joining a coalition. We refer to this
veto system as Aubin veto or veto in the sense of Aubin. An allocation x is
blocked in the sense of Aubin by the coalition S via the allocation y if there exist
coeﬃcients αi ∈ (0, 1], for each i ∈ S, such that (i)
￿
i∈S αiyi ≤
￿
i∈S αiωi, and
(ii) yi ￿i xi, for every i ∈ S and yj ￿j xj for some j ∈ S. The Aubin core of the
economy E , denoted by CA(E), is the set of all feasible allocations which cannot
be blocked in the sense of Aubin. Under the standard assumptions stated above,
Aubin (1979) showed that CA(E) = W (E).
Likewise the core, the Aubin core does not assess the “credibility” of the
objections; any attainable allocation which is blocked by a coalition is dismissed.
The argument that objections might be met with counter-objections leads to
bargaining set notions. Since the original bargaining set notion was introduced by
Aumann and Maschler (1964) for cooperative games, several versions have been
defined and studied. More specifically, Mas-Colell (1989) defined the bargaining
set for atomless economies.3 The idea of the definition is that this set contains
all the feasible allocations of the economy that are not blocked in a credible,
justified way. Recently, the original bargaining set was extended by Yang, Liu
and Liu (2011) to Aubin bargaining sets for games that they refer to as convex
cooperative fuzzy games. Shortly after, Liu and Liu (2012) gave a modification
3Mas-Colell (1989) not only adapted the original concept of bargaining set to atomless
economies but also proved, under conditions of generality similar to the Aumann’s (1964) core
equivalence theorem, that the bargaining set and the set of competitive allocations coincide.
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of the previous extension and obtained both existence and equivalence results
with other cooperative solutions. However they remarked that finding a proper
definition of Aubin bargaining set is not an easy task.
In the next section, we provide a concept of bargaining set by means of the
Aubin veto instead of the usual blocking mechanism. Thus, we extend and adapt
the notions of bargaining sets recently provided by Yang, Liu and Liu (2011) and
Liu and Liu (2012) for (transferable utility) cooperative games to finite exchange
economies. In addition, we will use the fact that, regarding Walrasian equilibria,
a finite economy E with n consumers is equivalent to a continuum economy Ec
with n-types of agents as we specify in which follows.
Consider a continuum economy where the set of agents is represented by the
unit real interval [0, 1] endowed with the Lebesgue measure µ (as in Aumann,
1964). There are only a finite number of types of consumers. Thus, I = [0, 1] =￿m
i=1 Ii, with µ(Ii) = ni/n (i.e., µ(Ii) is a rational number).4 Every t ∈ Ii has
the same endowments ωi and preference ￿i, that is, all the consumers in Ii are of
the same type i. Note that we can write Ii =
￿ni
j=1 Iij with µ(Iij) = 1/n for every
i, j. Consider now a finite economy with n agents and ni consumers of each type
i. Note that a feasible allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn), with xi = (xij, j = 1, . . . , ni),
in the finite economy defines a feasible allocation fx in the continuum economy
which is given by fx(t) = xij for every t ∈ Iij. Reciprocally, a feasible allocation f
in the continuum economy defines a feasible allocation xf in the finite economy
which is given by xfij = 1µ(Iij)
￿
Iij
f(t)dµ(t). Moreover, x (respectively f) is an
equal-treatment allocation if and only if so is fx (respectively xf ).
Under continuity and convexity of preferences, if (x, p) is a Walrasian equi-
librium in the n-agent economy, then (fx, p) is a competitive allocation in the
n-types continuum economy. Conversely, if (f, p) is a competitive equilibrium
in the continuum economy then (xf , p) is a Walrasian equilibrium in the finite
economy. (See, for instance, García-Cutrín and Hervés-Beloso,1993).
Consider now the economy E that we have defined at the beginning of this
section. Let Ec be the associated continuum economy, where the set of agents
is I = [0, 1] =
￿n
i=1 Ii,where Ii =
￿
i−1
n ,
i
n
￿
if i ￿= n; In =
￿
n−1
n , 1
￿
; and all the
agents in the subinterval Ii are of the same type i. In this particular case, x =
4Without loss of generality one can take Ii = [ai, ai+1), for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1}; with
a1 = 0, ai+1 − ai = ni/n and Im = [am, 1]. Equivalently, we can also take I = [0, n] and
Ii = [ni, ni + ni+1), for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}; with n1 = 0 and Im = [nm, n].
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(x1, . . . , xn) is a Walrasian allocation in the finite economy E if and only if the step
function fx (defined by fx(t) = xi for every t ∈ Ii) is a competitive allocation
in the continuum economy Ec. In short, the initial finite economy E and the
associated continuum economy Ec are equivalent regarding market equilibrium.
2.3 A Walras-bargaining equivalence
In economies with a continuum of agents that trade a finite number of commodi-
ties, the competitive equilibrium is not only characterized by the core (Aumann,
1964), but also by the bargaining set (Mas-Colell, 1989). The Mas-Colell bar-
gaining set is well defined for finite economies and, in this case, it can be larger
than the core (see example in Section 6 in Mas-Colell, 1989).
To specify the notion of Mas-Colell bargaining set for the finite economy E ,
let x be a feasible allocation that is blocked by a coalition S via the allocation y.
Then, the objection (S, y) to x has a counter-objection if there exists a coalition
T and an attainable allocation z for T such that zi ￿i yi for every i ∈ T ∩S and
zi ￿i xi for every i ∈ T \ S, where T \ S is the set of agents which are in T but
not in S.
An objection which cannot be counter-objected is said to be justified. Thus,
the Mas-Colell bargaining set of an economy contains all the feasible allocations
that, if they are objected (or blocked) they could also be counter-objected. Let
BMC(E) denote the Mas-Colell bargaining set for the economy E with n con-
sumers.
2.3.1 A bargaining set notion for finite economies
In this section we provide a definition of bargaining set for finite economies using
Aubin’s veto mechanism that will allow us to prove that the set of Walrasian
allocations and the bargaining set coincide.
An Aubin objection to x in the economy E is a pair (S, y), where S is a coalition
that blocks x via y in the sense of Aubin. Note that the coalition S can be also
defined by the parameters which specify the participation of its members.
An Aubin counter-objection to the objection (S, y) is a pair (T, z), where T is
a coalition and z is an allocation defined on T, for which there exist λi ∈ (0, 1]
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for each i ∈ T , such that:
(i)
￿
i∈T λizi ≤
￿
i∈T λiωi,
(ii) zi ￿i yi for every i ∈ T ∩ S and
(iii) zi ￿i xi for every i ∈ T \ S.
Remark. Consider that the parameters defining the participations rates of
each member in a blocking coalition S are rational numbers. Then, there are
natural numbers ai, i ∈ S and r ≥ max{ai, i ∈ S}, such that λi = ai/r for every
i ∈ S. That is, we can say that the blocking coalition is formed by ai agents of
type i. Therefore, when the participation rates are rational numbers, the veto
mechanism in the sense of Aubin is the standard veto system in sequence of
replicated economies.
From now on in this section and in the related proofs, every time we are in a
finite economy framework and write block, objection, counter-objection, or any
other concept related with a veto system, we refer to those notions in the sense
of Aubin unless stated otherwise.
Definition 2.3.1. A feasible allocation belongs to the (Aubin) bargaining set of
the finite economy if it has no justified objection. A justified objection is an
objection that has no counter-objection.
We denote by B(E) the bargaining set of the economy E as we have defined
above. Note that W (E) = CA(E) ⊆ B(E).
Our notion of bargaining set diﬀers from the one by Mas-Colell. To clarify this
point, let us highlight the main diﬀerences between the sets BMC(E) and B(E).
In our definition agents can join a coalition for objection or counter-objection
process, with a part of their initial endowments. That is, regarding the bargaining
system, agents can cooperate with diﬀerent participation levels and the attainable
bundles depend on these degrees of involvement. Furthermore, whenever an agent
i is assigned the commodity bundle yi within a coalition involved in an objection,
if she also joins a coalition for a counter-objection, then necessarily needs to
be assigned a bundle that improves her upon yi, independently of the rate of
participation of agent i in the coalition.5 This fact makes out one of the main
5This remark provides a diﬀerent way to overcome the weakness (pointed out by Liu and
Liu, 2012) of the related fuzzy bargaining set introduced by Yang, Liu and Liu (2011) for
(transferable utility) cooperative games.
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conceptual diﬀerences between Mas-Colell bargaining set and the bargaining set
using the veto mechanism in the sense of Aubin.
To be precise, considering the notion of Mas-Colell bargaining set, if a coali-
tion with a justified objection includes only part of some type of agents then it is
not possible for these agents to strictly improve at the objection.6 This is not the
case with our notion of justified objections. In particular, if we have a justified
objection (S, y) to the allocation x in a finite economy E , with rates of partici-
pation λi, i ∈ S, then the pair (S˜, y˜) given by any coalition S˜ in the associated
continuum economy Ec, such that the set of members in S˜ of type i (denoted by
S˜i) has measure λi, and y˜(t) = yi for every t ∈ S˜i, is an objection to the step
allocation fx in Ec, although it is not necessarily a justified objection. Basically,
this contrast is due to the somehow leadership condition that a type obtains
whenever any agent of such a type takes part in an objection, independently of
the degree of participation.
2.3.2 Walras-bargaining equivalence
The bargaining set we consider constitutes indeed an adequate way of “enlarg-
ing” the economy, permitting us to characterize Walrasian allocations in finite
economies as allocations with no justified objections. To this end, we show a pre-
liminary result that we will use in the proof of our Walras-bargaining equivalence
for economies with a finite number of consumers.
Lemma 2.3.1. Let x be an allocation in E . If (S, g) is a justified objection
(in the sense of Mas-Colell) to fx in the associated n-types continuum eco-
nomy Ec, then (S¯, g¯) is a justified objection to x in the finite E , where S¯ =
{i ∈ N | µ(S￿ Ii) > 0} and g¯i = 1µ(Si) ￿Si g(t)dµ(t), for every i ∈ S¯.
Proof. Let us assume that fx is objected by (S, g) meaning that:
￿
S g(t)dµ(t) ≤￿
S ω(t)dµ(t), g ￿t fx for every t ∈ S and µ ({t ∈ S|g ￿t fx}) > 0. Let Si = S ∩ Ii
and S¯ = {i ∈ N |µ(Si) > 0}. Since S blocks fx via g we have that there exists a
type k ∈ N and a set A ⊂ Sk = S ∩ Ik, with µ(A) > 0, such that g(t) ￿k fx, for
every t ∈ A.
Let g¯ be the allocation given by g¯i = 1µ(Si)
￿
Si
g(t)dµ(t), for every i ∈ S¯. Then,
by convexity of the preferences, we have g¯i ￿i xi = fx(t) for every t ∈ Si =
6For more details, see Remark 5 in Mas-Colell (1989). See also the related Lemma 3.4 in
Anderson, Trockel and Zhou (1997).
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S ∩ Ii and i ∈ S¯; and g¯k ￿k xk = fx(t) for every t ∈ Sk.7 Thus, (S¯, g¯) is an
objection à la Aubin to the allocation x in the economy E , since we have that:
(i)
￿
i∈S¯ µ(Si)g¯i ≤
￿
i∈S¯ µ(Si)ωi, (ii) g¯i ￿i xi for every i ∈ S¯ and (iii) there
exists k ∈ S¯ such that g¯k ￿k xk.
Assume that the objection (S¯, g¯) has a counter-objection (T¯ , z), that is, there
exists {λi}i∈T¯ with λi ∈ (0, 1] for every i ∈ T¯ , such that: (i)
￿
i∈T¯ λizi ≤￿
i∈T¯ λiωi, (ii) zi ￿i g¯i for every i ∈ T¯ ∩ S¯ and (iii) zi ￿i xi for every i ∈ T¯ \ S¯.
If T¯ ∩ S¯ = ∅ then, in the associated continuum economy Ec, any coalition
T =
￿
i∈T¯ Ti ⊂ I with µ(Ti) = λi, counter-objects the objection (S, g) via the
allocation fz given by fz(t) = zi for every t ∈ Ti. Otherwise (i.e., T¯ ∩ S¯ ￿= ∅),
from the previous condition (ii) we can deduce that for every i ∈ T¯ ∩ S¯, there
exists Ai ⊂ Si with µ(Ai) > 0, such that zi ￿i g(t) for every t ∈ Ai. This is again
a consequence of the convexity property of preferences. Let a = min{µ(Ai), i ∈
T¯ ∩ S¯} and take M large enough such that αi = λiM ≤ a for every i ∈ T¯ .
Consider a coalition T ⊂ I in the continuum economy Ec with T = ∪i∈T¯Ti,
such that Ti ⊂ Ai, if i ∈ T¯ ∩ S¯; Ti ⊂ Ii, if i ∈ T¯ \ S¯ and µ(Ti) = αi, for every
i ∈ T¯ . Then, defining the step function h as h(t) = zi if t ∈ Ti, we have that: (i)￿
T h(t)dµ(t) =
￿
i∈T¯ αizi ≤
￿
i∈T¯ αiωi =
￿
T ω(t)dµ(t), (ii) h(t) ￿i g(t) for every
t ∈ Ti with i ∈ T¯ ∩ S¯; and (iii) h(t) ￿i xi = fx(t) for every t ∈ Ti with i ∈ T¯ \ S¯.
Note that (ii) and (ii) mean h(t) ￿t g(t) for every t ∈ T ∩S and h(t) ￿t fx(t)
for every t ∈ T \ S, respectively. In other words, we have constructed a counter-
objection (T, h) for the objection (S, g), which concludes the proof.
Q.E.D.
Note that, in particular, we can conclude that if (S, g) is a justified objection
(in the sense of Mas-Colell) to fx in Ec, then so is (S, gˆ), where gˆ(t) = g¯i for
every t ∈ Si = S ∩ Ii and every i ∈ S¯.8 We remark that, in the proof of this
Lemma, we just use the corresponding notions of justified objections in E and
Ec, respectively, and we do not use the characterization of justified objections
that Mas-Colell (1989) showed and that can be applied to the associated n-types
continuum economy.
7See the Lemma in García-Cutrín and Hervés-Beloso (1993) for further details.
8We stress that when preferences are not strictly convex we cannot ensure that every justified
objection in the n-types continuum economy has the equal-treatment property. However, the
Lemma 2.3.1 ensures that given a justified objection in Ec there is also an equal-treatment
justified objection.
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Theorem 2.3.1. The bargaining set of the finite economy E coincides with the
set of Walrasian allocations.
Proof. Since the Aubin core coincides with the set of Walrasian allocations for
the economy E (see Aubin, 1979), we have that any Walrasian allocation has no
objection in the sense of Aubin and therefore belongs to the bargaining set of E .
Let us show that B(E) ⊆ W (E). Consider an allocation x ∈ B(E) and the step
function9 fx which is a feasible allocation in the associated n-types continuum
economy Ec. It suﬃces to show that fx belongs to the Mas-Colell bargaining set
of Ec.10 Let us assume that fx is blocked by the coalition S via the allocation g
in Ec and that (S, g) is a justified objection to fx in the sense of Mas-Colell. By
Lemma 2.3.1 we can ensure that (S¯, g¯) is a justified objection to x in E , where
g¯i =
1
µ(Si)
￿
Si
g(t)dµ(t), for every i ∈ S¯ = {i ∈ N | µ(S ∩ Ii) > 0}. This is a
contradiction with the fact that x ∈ B(E) and concludes the proof.
Q.E.D.
Enlarging the set of coalitions has a double eﬀect. On one hand, objecting
is easier allowing for more justified objections which, in turn, would make the
bargaining set smaller. On the other hand, counter-objecting is also easier, which
would eliminate more objections, making more diﬃcult the equivalence to hold.
There is still another eﬀect that comes from the already remarked fact that if a
type participates in both an objection and counter-objection, then an improve-
ment is required in the counter-objection with respect the objection for such a
type. The aggregate eﬀect is therefore not clear, which makes our equivalence
result not trivial.
Let us remind that Dutta et al. (1989) introduced the concept of consistency
regarding the bargaining set, going one step further and trying to assess not only
the credibility of the objections but also of the counter-objections involved in
the process. They establish a notion of consistent bargaining set meaning that
each objection in a “chain” of objections is tested (credible) in precisely the same
way as its predecessor. However, the authors recognize that in a context of an
exchange economy with a continuum of agents, the equivalence result by Mas-
Colell (1989) implies that his bargaining set is consistent. Since we provide an
9For every t ∈ [0, 1], fx(t) = xi if t ∈ Ii
10This is so because the Mas-Colell bargaining set of Ec equals the set of competitive al-
locations (Mas-Colell, 1989), which is also equivalent to the core (Aumann, 1964), and fx is
competitive in Ec if and only if x is Walrasian in E .
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equivalence result , we also have consistency of our bargaining set.
2.3.3 Justified objections as Walrasian objections
We remark that Theorem 2.3.1 states that any non Walrasian allocation has a
justified objection. We finish this section by characterizing justified objections
as Walrasian objections. This characterization is a discrete approach to the one
stated by Mas-Colell (1989) for continuum economies. The concept of Walrasian
objection requires the introduction of a price system p, and is based on a self
selection property: members that participate in a coalition in a Walrasian ob-
jection against an allocation are those ones that would rather trade at the price
vector p than get the consumption bundle they receive by such an allocation.
Next notion of Walrasian objection diﬀers from the one by Mas-Colell (1989)
and reflects the diﬀerences between BMC(E) and B(E).
Definition 2.3.2. Let x be an allocation in the finite economy E . An (Aubin)
objection (S, y) to x is said to be Walrasian if there exists a price system p such
that (i) p · v ≥ p · ωi if v ￿i yi, i ∈ S and (ii) p · v ≥ p · ωi if v ￿i xi, i /∈ S.
We remark that, under the assumptions of monotonicity and strict positivity
of the endowments, we know that p ￿ 0, and therefore conditions (i) and (ii)
above can be written as follows: v ￿i yi implies p · v > p · ωi, for i ∈ S and
v ￿i xi implies p · v > p · ωi for i /∈ S.
Observe that the notion of Walrasian objection in the finite economy E does
not depend explicitly on the rates of participation of the members in the coali-
tion that objects an allocation. To be precise, in order to check whether the
objection (S, y) is Walrasian, it does not matter the degree of participation of
the individuals joining the coalition S that make the allocation y attainable à la
Aubin; which becomes important is the set of consumers that are involved in the
objection.
Proposition 2.3.1. Let x be a feasible allocation in the finite economy E . Then,
any objection to the allocation x is justified if and only if it is a Walrasian
objection.
Proof. Let (S, y) be an objection à la Aubin to x. Assume (T, z) is a counter-
objection in the sense of Aubin to (S, y). Then, there exist coeﬃcientsλi ∈ (0, 1]
for each i ∈ T , such that: ￿i∈T λizi ≤ ￿i∈T λiωi; zi ￿i yi for every i ∈ T ∩ S
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and zi ￿i xi for every i ∈ T \ S. Since (S, y) is a Walrasian objection at prices
p we have that p · zi > p · ωi, for every i ∈ T ∩ S and p · zi > p · ωi, for every
i ∈ T \ S. This implies p ·￿i∈T λizi > p ·￿i∈T λiωi, which contradicts that z is
attainable by T with weights λi, i ∈ T. Thus, we conclude that (S, y) is a justified
objection.
To show the converse, let (S, y) be a justified objection to x and let a =
(a1, . . . , an) be an allocation (not necessarily feasible) such that ai = yi if i ∈ S
and ai = xi if i /∈ S. For every consumer i define Γi = {z ∈ IR￿|z+ωi ￿i ai}
￿{0}
and let Γ be the convex hull of the union of the sets Γi, i ∈ N.
Let us show that Γ
￿
(−IR￿++) is empty. Assume that δ ∈ Γ
￿
(−IR￿++). Then,
there is λ = (λi, i ∈ N) ∈ [0, 1]n, with
￿n
i=1 λi = 1, such that δ =
￿n
i=1 λizi ∈ Γ.
This implies that the coalition T = {j ∈ N | λj > 0} counter-objects (S, y) via
the allocation zˆ where zˆi = zi + ωi − δ for each i ∈ T. Indeed,
￿
j∈T λj zˆj =￿
j∈T λjωj. Moreover, since zi ∈ Γi for every i ∈ T and δ ￿ 0, by monotonicity
of preferences, zˆi ￿i yi for every i ∈ T ∩ S and zˆi ￿i xi for every i ∈ T \ S. This
is a contradiction.
Thus, Γ
￿
(−IR￿++) = ∅, which implies that 0 is a frontier point of Γ. Then,
there exists a hyperplane that supports Γ at 0. That is, there exists a price
system p such that p · z ≥ 0 for every z ∈ Γ. This means that p · v ≥ p ·
ωi, if v ￿i ai. Therefore, we conclude that (S, y) is a Walrasian objection.
Q.E.D.
The fact that any Walrasian objection is a justified objection in finite eco-
nomies allows us to refine our Walras-bargaining equivalence and its proof in
terms of Walrasian objections. To see this, let x be a feasible allocation in E .
Note that we can now guarantee that if x is not a Walrasian allocation, then it
has a Walrasian objection. Moreover, applying Proposition 2.3.1, Lemma 2.3.1
states that if (S, g) is a Walrasian objection (in the sense of Mas-Colell) to fx in
the associated n-types continuum economy Ec, then (S¯, g¯) is a Walrasian objec-
tion to x in the finite E , where S¯ = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | µ(Si) = µ(S
￿
Ii) > 0} and
g¯i =
1
µ(Si)
￿
Si
g(t)dµ(t), for every i ∈ S¯.
Let x be a feasible allocation in E and (S, y) an objection to x, being αi the
participation of each i ∈ S. Denote by ES(α) the continuum economy formed only
by consumers of types in S and such that the measure of the set of agents of type
i is αi. From Proposition 2.3.1, we can deduce that when S = N, the objection
44 2. BARGAINING SETS IN FINITE ECONOMIES
(S, y) is justified if and only if y is a competitive allocation in the restricted
continuum economy EN(α). However, note that in general an objection given by
a coalition S and a competitive allocation of ES(α) is not necessarily a justified
(or Walrasian) objection. Being a Walrasian objection is much more demanding.
We also remark that the fact that (S, y) is a justified objection to x and yi ￿i xi
does not imply αi = 1. This is in contrast with Mas-Colell’s notion for which if
a coalition with a justified objection includes only part of some type of agents
then it is not possible for these agents to strictly improve at the objection.
In short, we stress that, since justified and Walrasian objections coincide,
one can conclude that such a characterization points out that the concept of
Walrasian objection in the finite framework is also more than a technical tool to
refine the Walras-bargaining equivalence.
2.4 Restricting coalition formation
Both Mas Colell’s (1989) result and our Walras-bargaining equivalence implic-
itly require the formation of all coalitions in the objection and counter-objecting
mechanism. That is, checking whether a given allocation belongs to the bar-
gaining set seems to require to contemplate the whole set of possible coalitions
in order to test whether any group of agents, by using their own resources, can
improve upon an allocation either in the objection or counter-objection process.
This may be a great task, even when the economy is small, provided that agents
can participate in a coalition with a part of their endowments. Indeed, the
Aubin veto system in a finite economy is equivalent to the blocking scheme in
the associated continuum economy, with a finite number of types, conducted by
equal-treatment allocations.
We also remark that the formation of coalitions may imply some theoreti-
cal diﬃculties. It is usually argued that the costs, which arise from forming a
coalition, are not at all negligible. Incompatibilities among diﬀerent agents may
appear and a big amount of information and communication might be needed
to really form a coalition. Thus, sometimes, it will not suﬃce to merely say
that several agents constitute a coalition since it may result in high formation
costs, commitments and constraints, which make diﬃcult to assume that the
veto mechanism underlying cooperative solutions, like the core or the bargaining
set, works freely and spontaneously.
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In this section, the diﬃculty to argue that coalition formation is costless leads
us to consider a restricted veto mechanism in the procedure leading to the bar-
gaining set. Thus, we assume that not all the parameters, which specify the
degree of participation of agents when become members of a coalition, are ad-
missible. Then, we study the consequences that this assumption has with regard
to the bargaining set solution.
To this end, we consider that a coalition S is defined by the rates of partic-
ipation of its members, which is given by a vector λS = (λi, i ∈ S) ∈ (0, 1]|S|,
where |S| denotes the cardinality of S.
Consider that for each coalition S the participation rates are restricted to
a subset ΛS ⊂ [0, 1]|S|. Let us denote by BΛ(E) (respectively BΛ(E)) the bar-
gaining set where a coalition S can object (respectively counter-object) only
with participation rates in ΛS. When the set of coalitions is restricted in the
objection (respectively counter-objection) process it becomes harder to block
an allocation (respectively to counter-object an objection) and then we have
BΛ(E) ⊆ B(E) ⊆ BΛ(E). In addition, if Λ, ￿Λ are such that ΛS ⊆ ￿ΛS for every
coalition S, then BΛ(E) ⊆ B￿Λ(E) but B￿Λ(E) ⊆ BΛ(E). Therefore, restricting the
set of coalitions that are able to object enlarges the bargaining set whereas re-
stricting the coalition formation in the counter-objection mechanism diminishes
the bargaining set instead. This is so because when not all the coalitions can
take part in the bargaining mechanism, on the one hand blocking is harder but
on the other hand it is easier that an admissible objection becomes credible or
justified.
In the case of continuum economies, following Schmeidler (1972), we can in-
terpret the measure of a coalition as the amount of (or cost of) information
and communication needed in order to form such a coalition. Then, it may be
meaningful to consider those coalitions whose size converges to zero; that is, the
coalitions with small formation cost. We convey this argument to economies
with a finite number of agents where the veto system in the sense of Aubin is
considered. For this, given δ ∈ (0, 1], let δ-B(E) denote the bargaining set of the
economy E where the participation rate of any agent in any coalition, both in
the objection and counter-objection procedure, is restricted to be less or equal
than δ.
Next result is related with the remark on the core of atomless economies
stated by Schmeilder (1972), showing that in order to obtain the core of a con-
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tinuum economy it is enough to consider the blocking power of arbitrarily small
coalitions.
Lemma 2.4.1. All the δ-bargaining sets are equal and coincide with the bargaining
set in the finite economy E . That is, δ-B(E) = B(E), for every δ ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. Let an allocation y be attainable for a coalition S with participation
rates λi, i ∈ S. That is,
￿
i∈S λiyi ≤
￿
i∈S λiωi. It suﬃces to note that there exists
(αi, i ∈ S), with αi ≤ δ for every i ∈ S such that
￿
i∈S αiyi ≤
￿
i∈S αiωi. To see
this, take M large enough so that αi = λi/M ≤ δ, for every i ∈ S. Thus, the
same allocation y is also attainable for the same coalition S with participation
rates arbitrarily small. The same reasoning holds for the case of both objections
and counter-objections.
Q.E.D.
The above result is in contrast with the work by Schjødt and Sloth (1994)
who showed that, in continuum economies, when one restricts the coalitions par-
ticipating in objections and counter-objections to those whose size is arbitrarily
small, then the Mas-Colell bargaining set becomes strictly larger than the orig-
inal one. In other words, in atomless economies and contrary to the core, the
formation of only arbitrarily small coalitions in the bargaining process does not
allow to characterize the competitive allocations. This is due to the fact that
limiting the size of coalitions in continuum economies prevents to obtain justi-
fied objections. This is not the case in economies with a finite number of agents
when one restricts the participation rates of members forming a coalition to those
arbitrarily small. Thus, the previous lemma marks a further contrast between
Mas-Collel’s bargaining set for continuum economies and our finite approach.
Symmetrically to Schmeidler’s (1972) and Grodal’s (1972)11 core characteri-
zations for atomless economies, Vind (1972) showed that in order to block any
non-competitive allocation it is enough to consider the veto power of arbitrarily
large coalitions. This result allows to show that in order to obtain the Aubin core
it suﬃces the formation of only one coalition, namely, the big coalition, which is
formed by all the agents in the economy; moreover, for every consumer the en-
dowment participation rate can be chosen to be arbitrarily close to one, i.e., the
11Grodal extended Schmeidler’s result by showing that, given δ ∈ (0, 1), the blocking coali-
tions can be restricted to those with measure less than δ that are also union of at most ￿ + 1
subcoalitions with diameter less than δ.
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parameters defining the degree of joining in the big coalition can be restricted to
those close to the total participation (see Hervés-Beloso and Moreno-García, 2001
and Hervés-Beloso, Moreno-García and Yannelis, 2005). Next example shows
that this restriction on coalition formation cannot be adapted to the bargaining
set solution we address.
Example 2.4.1. Let E be an economy with two consumers who trade two commo-
dities, a and b. Both agents have the same preference relation represented by the
utility function U(a, b) = ab, and both are initially endowed with one unit of
each commodity. Let us consider the feasible allocation x which assigns the bun-
dle x1 = (2, 2) to the individual 1 and the bundle x2 = (0, 0) to individual 2.
The allocation x does not belong to the bargaining set (it does not belong to
the core and it is not a Walrasian allocation). In fact, x is blocked in the sense
of Aubin by S = {2} with any participation rate λ ∈ (0, 1]. Moreover, every
objection ({2}, (1, 1)), with any λ ∈ (0, 1], has no counter-objection à la Aubin
and, therefore, is justified.
Note that there exists y such that the coalition {1, 2} objects x in the sense
of Aubin via y = (y1, y2), with strictly positive weights. That is, there exits
(λ1,λ2) ∈ (0, 1]2 such that λ1y1+λ2y2 ≤ (λ1+λ2)(1, 1). In addition U(y1) ≥ 4 and
U(y2) ≥ 0, with at least one strict inequality. This implies that U(y2) < U(ω2) =
1. Therefore, any objection where the participation parameters are restricted to
be strictly positive for every consumer is counter-objected by individual 2.
We conclude that in contrast to the Aubin core, we cannot restrict the coali-
tion formation to the grand coalition with parameters close enough to the total
participation.
Next we state a similar example showing that we cannot state such a restric-
tion in the counter-objecting mechanism either.
Example 2.4.2. Let E be an economy with three consumers who trade two
commodities, a and b. All the agents have the same preference relation repre-
sented by the utility function U(a, b) = ab, and are initially endowed with one
unit of each commodity. Let us consider the feasible allocation x which assigns
the bundle x1 = (3, 3) to the individual 1 and the bundle x2 = x3 = (0, 0)
to individuals 2 and 3. The allocation x is blocked in the sense of Aubin by
S = {2} with any participation rate λ ∈ (0, 1]. Note also that ({3}, (1, 1)) is
a counter-objection to the objection ({2}, (1, 1)) . However, there is no counter-
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objection to ({2}, (1, 1)) if all the participation rates are required to be, for
instance, larger than 1/2.12 To see this, assume that {1, 2, 3} counter-objects,
with weights λi, i = 1, 2, 3. Given the preference relations, we can conclude that
3λ1+λ2 < λ1+λ2+λ3.We get a contradiction with the fact that λ1,λ3 ∈ (1/2, 1].
To finish this section, we consider a quite diﬀerent restriction for the partici-
pation rates of the agents in coalitions. As the following lemma states, it turns
out that the bargaining set is entirely characterized when the participation rates
of agents in coalitions involved in counter-objections are rational numbers.
Lemma 2.4.2. Let BQ(E) denote the bargaining set of the economy E where
only rational numbers are allowed as participation rates in the counter-objection
process. Then, BQ(E) = B(E).
Proof. Let x be a feasible allocation and (S, y) an objection to x. Let (T, z) be
a counter-objection to (S, y). This means that there exist coeﬃcients αi, i ∈ T ,
such that (i)
￿
i∈T αizi =
￿
i∈T αiωi and (ii) zi ￿i yi for every i ∈ T ∩ S, and
zi ￿i xi for every i ∈ T \ S.
For every natural k ∈ IN, we define aki , i ∈ T , as the smallest integer greater
than or equal to kαi. Let us denote zki =
kαi
aki
(zi − ωi) + ωi. Since lim
k→∞
zki = zi
for every i ∈ T, by continuity of preferences, we have that zki ￿i yi for every
i ∈ T ∩ S and zki ￿i xi for every i ∈ T \ S, for all k large enough.
By construction, we have
￿
i∈T a
k
i (z
k
i − ωi) = 0. Denoting qki = a
k
i￿
i∈T aki
we
obtain (i)
￿
i∈T q
k
i z
k
i =
￿
i∈T q
k
i ωi and (ii) zki ￿i yi for every i ∈ T ∩ S, and
zki ￿i xi for every i ∈ T \ S, for all k large enough.
Q.E.D.
The restriction in the previous lemma is equivalent to the veto mechanism
in the sequence of replicated economies with equal treatment allocations. Then,
we conclude that an Aubin objection (S, y) to x is justified if and only if the
allocation (feasible or not) which assigns yi to agents of type i ∈ S and xi to
agents of type i ∈ N \ S is not objected in any replicated economy.
We remark that, taking into account the observations on restricting coalition
formation in the previous section, Lemma 2.4.2 can be obtained as an immediate
12The same remains true if the parameters are required to be larger than any number in
(1/2, 1).
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consequence of our bargainin-Walras equivalence. However, we provide a proof
which does not use the equality W (E) = B(E).
2.5 Additional characterizations
Given our equivalence results, any characterization of Walrasian equilibrium for
finite economies turns immediately into an additional characterization of the bar-
gaining set. In this section we pick up two diﬀerent ways of identifying Walrasian
allocations and recast them in terms of bargaining sets as corollaries.
First, let us consider a feasible allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn) in the economy
E . Following Hervés-Beloso, Moreno-García and Yannelis (2005), we define a
family of economies denoted by E(a, x), a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ [0, 1]n, which coincide
with E except for the endowments that, for each agent i ∈ N , are defined by
ωi(a, x) = aixi+(1−ai)ωi. An allocation (feasible or not ) is said to be dominated
in the economy E if it is blocked by the grand coalition N.
In the aforementioned work it was proved that, under the assumptions we have
considered, an allocation x is Walrasian in the economy E if and only if it is not
dominated in any perturbed economy E(a, x). This characterization allows us to
write the next corollary as an immediate consequence of the Walras-bargaining
equivalence we have obtained in Theorem 2.3.1.
Corollary 2.5.1. An allocation x belongs to the bargaining set of E (equivalently,
to the leader bargaining set of every replicated economy rE) if and only if it is
not dominated in any economy E(a, x).
An alternative way of stating the above result is: The allocation x has a
justified objection (equivalently, a Walrasian objection) in the economy E if and
only if x is blocked by the grand coalition in some economy E(a, x).
The essence of the second characterization of Walrasian equilibrium that we
recast for bargaining sets diﬀers substantially from the previous ones. It fol-
lows a non-cooperative game theoretical approach and provides insights into the
mechanism through which the bargaining process is conducted.
Given the finite economy E = (IR￿+,￿i,ωi, i ∈ N), let us define an associated
game G as follows. There are two players. The strategy sets for the players are
given by:
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S1 = { x = (x1, ..., xn) ∈ IR￿n+ such that xi ￿= 0 and
￿n
i=1 xi ≤
￿n
i=1 ωi}.
S2 = {(a, y) ∈ [α, 1]n × IR￿n+ such that
￿n
i=1 aiyi ≤
￿n
i=1 aiωi},
where α is a real number such that 0 < α < 1.
Given a strategy profile s = (x, (a, y)) ∈ S1 × S2, the payoﬀ functions Π1 and
Π2, for player 1 and 2, respectively, are defined as Π1(x, (a, y)) = mini{Ui(xi)−
Ui(yi)} and Π2(x, (a, y)) = mini{ai (Ui(yi)− Ui(xi))}.
Note that if Π2(x, (a, y)) > 0, then the allocation x is blocked via y by the big
coalition being ai the participation rate of each consumer i. Actually, player 2
gets a positive payoﬀ if and only the big coalition objects in the sense of Aubin
the allocation proposed by player 1.
As an immediate consequence of our bargaining-Walras equivalence and The-
orem 4.1 in Hervés-Beloso and Moreno-García (2009) we obtain the following
corollary.
Corollary 2.5.2. x belongs to the bargaining set of the economy E , if and only
if (x, (b, x)) with bi = b, for every i = 1, . . . , n, ( for instance (x, (1, x)) ) is a
Nash equilibrium for the game G.
To finish, we remark that the spirit of the bargaining set notions we have
considered seems to indicate that additional and finer characterizations for such
cooperative concepts could be obtained through non-cooperative solutions of
diﬀerent games, in which a player represents the objection system whereas other
one is in charge of the counter-objection mechanism. This is part of our further
research.
Chapter 3
Convergence results on bargaining
sets
3.1 Introduction
Since models with a continuum of agents are thought of as idealizations of large
economies, one might expect the Mas-Colell bargaining set to become approxi-
mately competitive in sequences of economies as the number of agents increases.
However, as we have already remarked, Anderson, Trockel and Zhou (1997)
showed that the bargaining set does not shrink to the set of Walrasian allo-
cations by replicating the economy. They state a replica sequence of economies
where the Mas-Colell bargaining set does not converge no matter how nice the
preferences may be.1 Thus, the work by ATZ gives insights into the discrepancy
between the behavior of the Mas-Colell bargaining set in the continuum and its
behavior in sequences of large finite economies.
In this chapter we provide a diﬀerent notion of bargaining set that makes
significant use of the replica structure and allows us to obtain convergence results,
reinforcing Edgeworth’s conjecture and Debreu-Scarf’s (1963) result in the light
of bargaining set concepts.
We emphasize that the Aubin veto mechanism becomes the blocking system
in replicated economies as long as the participation rates are fractions (rational
1They provide a non-convergence result for Zhou’s (1994) bargaining set, which requires
additional restrictions on counter-objections. These restrictions make justified objections easier
to form and then make this bargaining set smaller than Mas-Colell’s.
51
52 3. CONVERGENCE RESULTS ON BARGAINING SETS
numbers) and equal-treatment allocations are considered in the replicas. Thus,
in which follows, we rewrite and analyze our bargaining set concept for replicated
economies in the spirit of Edgeworth’s conjecture, resulting in what we refer to
as Edgeworth bargaining set. This is so because it works by taking into account
the whole replica structure, and not only what happens at each step as the
economy is replicated. Actually, going back to the work by ATZ, we show that it
cannot be used to prove non-convergence for the Edgeworth bargaining set and,
at the same time, this analysis allows us to obtain an alternative and simple
proof of the result by ATZ. Furthermore, we provide an example that shows
the impossibility of obtaining an exact convergence result for the Edgeworth
bargaining set. The example points out why it is not possible to get to that
convergence result and how this could be fixed. Indeed, considering a continuity
property of the equilibrium correspondence, we obtain a generic convergence
result for the Edgeworth bargaining set. Next, considering a notion of leader
in the objection process we show that the corresponding Edgeworth bargaining
set shrinks and converges to the set of Walrasian allocations, providing an exact
convergence result.
3.2 Edgeworth bargaining set
Consider the finite economy E = (IR￿+,￿i,ωi, i ∈ N). For each positive integer
r, the r-fold replica economy rE of E is a new economy with rn agents indexed
by ij j = 1, . . . , r, such that each consumer ij has a preference relation ￿ij=￿i
and endowments ωij = ωi. That is, rE is a pure exchange economy with r agents
of type i for every i ∈ N. Given a feasible allocation x in E let rx denote the
corresponding equal treatment allocation in rE , which is given by rxij = xi for
every j ∈ {1, . . . , r} and i ∈ N.
The allocation rx is objected in rE if there exists a collection S of types and ri
agents of each type i ∈ S which are able to attain an equal treatment allocation
which improves rx. To be precise, if there exist commodity bundles yi, i ∈ S such
that
￿
i∈S riyi ≤
￿
i∈S riωi and yi ￿i xi for every i ∈ S, with strict preference
for some i0 ∈ S.
Let (S, y) be an objection to rx in the economy rE . The pair (T, z) is a
counter-objection to the objection (S, y) if there exist natural numbers ni, i ∈ T,
such that
￿
i∈T nizi ≤
￿
i∈T niωi and zi ￿i yi for every i ∈ T ∩ S and zi ￿i xi
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for ever i ∈ T \ S.
An objection to rx in the economy rE is justified if it is not counter-objected
in any replicated economy. We say that the feasible allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn)
belongs to the bargaining set of rE and write x ∈ B(rE) if the allocation rx has
no justified objection in rE .
We refer to this bargaining set of a replicated economy as Edgeworth bargain-
ing set. We remark that, according to the notion above, if rx has a justified
objection in rE , then the same objection is also justified in rˆE for any rˆ ≥ r.
Thus, as it happens with the core, this Edgeworth bargaining set shrinks under
replication, i.e., for any natural number r we have that B((r + 1)E) ⊆ B(rE).
3.3 Anderson-Trockel-Zhou’s counterexample re-
visited
Let us now analyze the same example considered by ATZ under this notion
of Edgeworth bargaining sets. There are two consumers and two commodities
denoted by a and b. The endowments are ω1 = (3, 1) and ω2 = (1, 3). Both
consumers have the same utility function U(a, b) =
√
ab. Let H denote the set
of individually rational, Pareto optimal and equal-treatment allocations in the
sequence of replicated economies. Given α ∈ [0, 4], let h(α) be the allocation
that gives (α,α) to agents of type 1 and (4−α, 4−α) to agents of type 2. Then,
H = ￿h(α), with α ∈ ￿√3, 4−√3￿￿ . ATZ showed that the measure of the set of
allocations in H which are not in the Mas-Colell and Zhou bargaining sets tends
to zero as the economy is replicated. Therefore, they provide a non-convergence
example for the Mas-Colell bargaining set in sequences of replicated economies.
Consider r1 agents of type 1 and r2 of type 2. Let a be numeraire and let p
denote de price of b. Let τ = r1/r2. Some calculations show that the Walrasian
equilibrium for this restricted replicated economy E(τ) is given by the price
p(τ) = 3τ+1τ+3 , and the allocation which assigns x1(τ) =
￿
3τ+5
τ+3 ,
3τ+5
3τ+1
￿
and x2(τ) =￿
5τ+3
τ+3 ,
5τ+3
3τ+1
￿
to agents of type 1 and 2, respectively.
For each τ ∈ IR+, let Vi(τ) = (U(xi(τ)))2 , for i = 1, 2. The function V1
is decreasing and convex whereas V2 is increasing and concave. For each α ∈
(
√
3, 4 − √3), there exist τα and τα such that V1(τα) = α2 and V2(τα) = (4 −
α)2. Note that α = 2 defines the Walrasian allocation and V1(1) = V2(1) = 4.
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However, for any α ￿= 2, we have τα < τα. To see this, note that since h(α) is
not a Walrasian allocation, there is a Warasian objection in the sense of Mas-
Colell in the associated continuum economy. That is, there are β1, β2 ∈ (0, 1]
and an allocation (y1, y2) such that β1y1 + β2y2 ≤ β1ω1 + β2ω2, U(y1) ≥ α and
U(y2) ≥ (4−α) with one strict inequality. Since h(α) is eﬃcient, β1 ￿= β2. Assume
β1 < β2 and let τ ∗ = β1/β2. Then τ ∗ = τα and V2(τ ∗) > (4 − α)2 = V2(τα).2
Since V2 is an increasing function, τα < τα = τ ∗. Since V1 is decreasing, the case
β1 > β2 is analogous.
Let α ∈ (√3, 2) ∪ (2, 4 − √3). Then, V1(τ) > α2 and V2(τ) > (4 − α)2,
for any τ ∈ (τα, τα). For each rational number τ ∈ (τα, τα), let r1(τ), r2(τ) be
natural numbers such that τ = r1(τ)/r2(τ). We can conclude that the coalition
formed by r1(τ) consumers of type 1 and r2(τ) of type 2 with the allocation
x(τ) is a Walrasian objection to rh(α) for any replicated economy rE with r ≥
max{r1(τ), r2(τ)}. Our Proposition 2.3.1 allows us to conclude that the objection
we have obtained is justified. Therefore, the argument by ATZ does not lead to
a non-convergence result for the notion of Edgeworth bargaining set we have
proposed.
3.3.1 An alternative proof for the non-convergence of the
Mas-Colell bargaining set.
The previous argument leads to a diﬀerent way to prove that the Mas-Colell bar-
gaining set does not converge when we replicate the economy. To show this,
consider the allocation xˆ given by xˆ1 = (4, 4) − x2(
√
2) and xˆ2 = x2(
√
2).
Note that xˆ is not Walrasian. We find a unique positive number τˆ such that
(U(xˆ1))2 = V1(τˆ).3 Consider the two types associated economy where agents of
type 1 are represented by the interval [0,1] and agents of type 2 by (1,2]. Since V1
is decreasing and xˆ is individually rational, the set of all potential justified objec-
tions (in the sense of Mas-Colell) is given by the interval [
√
2, τˆ ] (see figure below).
Any coalition S ⊂ [0, 2] such that µ(S ∩ [0, 1]) = 1 and µ(S ∩ (1, 2]) = 1/√2
blocks fxˆ (the step function given by xˆ) via the allocation that assigns x1(
√
2)
to agents in S ∩ [0, 1] and x2(
√
2) to agents in S ∩ (1, 2]. Furthermore, these
objections are the unique Walrasian objections (in the sense of Mas-Colell) to
2See Remark 5 in Mas-Colell (1989).
3Equivalently, 9τˆ
2+30τˆ+25
3τˆ2+10τˆ+3 =
62
√
2−5
10
√
2+9
, and some calculations show that τˆ ￿ 1.6634.
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fxˆ.4 This implies that the only coalitions able to make a justified objection are
those with measure 1+1/
√
2. In other words, although every τ ∈ [√2, τˆ ] defines
an objection to fxˆ, the unique which is (Mas-Colell) justified is given by τ =
√
2.
Thus we conclude that it is not possible to find a justified objection (in the sense
of Mas-Colell) in any replicated economy, that is, rxˆ belongs to the Mas-Colell
bargaining set of rE for every r, which proves the non-convergence.5
√
2 τˆ
V1
V2
Fig 1: (U(xˆ1))2 = V1(τˆ) and (U(xˆ2))2 = V2(
√
2).
3.4 A counterexample
Next, we first state a counterexample showing that we cannot obtain an exact
convergence result for the Edgeworth bargaining set. However, the example itself
also indicates the nature of the problem with achieving such a convergence and
the type of condition that will be needed to obtain it. As we will see, such a
condition is a continuity property of the correspondence between economies and
prices. This condition may be expected to hold in a wide class of situations, so
the example is essentially the exception rather than the rule.
Counterexample. Let E be an exchange economy with two commodities and
4This is so because if a coalition with a Mas-Colell justified objection includes only part of
some type of agents then it is not possible for these agents to strictly improve at the objection.
5Note that any τ ∈ [√2, τˆ ] defines an (Aubin) justified objection to xˆ via the Walrasian
allocation x(τ) of the economy E(τ). Then, any rational number τ ∈ ￿√2, τˆ￿ leads to a justified
objection for some replicated economy. This implies that xˆ does not belong to the Edgeworth
bargaining set for any large enough replicated economy.
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two agents, endowed with ω1 = (ωx1 ,ω
y
1) = (2, 1) and ω2 = (ωx2 ,ω
y
2) = (1, 2)
respectively, who have the same utility function U , defined as follows:
U(x, y) =

1
21/4
√
x+
√
y if x >
√
2 y, and
√
x+ (2− 21/4)√y if x ≤ √2 y.
Let x be the numeraire good and let p denote the price of y. The demand
function for each agent i is
di(p) =

￿
p (ωxi +pω
y
i )
p+
√
2
,
√
2 (ωxi +pω
y
i )
p2+
√
2 p
￿
if p > p,￿√
2 (ωxi +pω
y
i )
p+
√
2
, ω
x
i +pω
y
i
p+
√
2
￿
if p ∈ ￿p, p￿ , and￿
p (ωxi +pω
y
i )
p+(2−21/4)2
,
(2−21/4)2 (ωxi +pωyi )
p2+p(2−21/4)2
￿
if p < p,
where p = 21/4(2− 21/4) and p = √2.
The Walrasian equilibrium price for this economy is p∗ = 2 − 21/4, and
the resulting Walrasian allocation assigns the bundle d1(p∗) =
￿
4−21/4
3−21/4 ,
4−21/4
3−21/4
￿
,
d2(p∗) =
￿
5−25/4
3−21/4 ,
5−25/4
3−21/4
￿
to agent 1 and 2, respectively.
Now consider there are r1 agents of type 1 and r2 of type 2 and let τ = r1/r2.
Some calculations show that the Walrasian equilibrium prices for this restricted
replicated economy, E(τ), are
p(τ) =

21/4
￿
2τ+1
τ+2 if τ > τ
∗,￿
p, p
￿
if τ = τ ∗, and
(2− 21/4)
￿
2τ+1
τ+2 if τ < τ
∗,
where τ ∗ = 1 + 32
√
2.
Note that there is a continuum of Walrasian equilibria for the restricted eco-
nomy E(τ ∗) and a unique Walrasian equilibrium for any other economy E(τ)
with τ ￿= τ ∗. For each τ ∈ IR+, the utility levels that can be attained for each
type of consumers at a Walrasian allocation of the economy E(τ) are given by
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the mappings Vi(τ) = U(di(p(τ))), i = 1, 2, whose graphical representations are
shown in the following figure, where αi = min{Vi(τ ∗)} and βi = max{Vi(τ ∗)} :
τ∗
α1
β1
α2
β2
V2
V1
τ
V
i(
τ
)
Fig. 2: V1 and V2 are not lower semicontinuous at τ∗.
Now consider a feasible allocation h = (h1, h2) such that U(hi) ∈ (αi, βi).6
This allocation is individually rational and therefore, in order to block h in some
replicated economy, both types need to be present. In addition, there is no
justified objection for h whenever τ > τ ∗ or τ < τ ∗. It is possible, though, to
find justified objections given by a set of Walrasian allocations in the economy
E(τ ∗), which has a continuum of Walrasian equilibria. Let pi be the Walrasian
equilibrium price for E(τ ∗) such that U(di(pi)) = U(hi). As illustrated in the
figure below, any price in [p2, p1] ⊂
￿
p, p
￿
leads to a justified objection. However,
since τ ∗ is an irrational number, such set of justified objections cannot be attained
in any replicated economy, which proves the non-convergence.
6For instance, we can take h1 =
￿
112
52(3−21/4)2
, 11
2
52(3−21/4)2
￿
and h2 = (3, 3)− h1.
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p2 p1
U(h2)
U(h1)
V ∗1
V ∗2
Fig. 3: We get this grafic by “zooming in” on the figure 2 when τ = τ∗.
V ∗i (p) = U(di(p)), with p ∈ p(τ∗).
3.5 A generic convergence result
The previous example shows the impossibility of obtaining a convergence result
if we allow for discontinuities of the equilibrium correspondence. Nevertheless,
we are able to show a generic convergence result. Indeed, next we will show
that under a continuity property of the equilibrium price correspondence, the
Walrasian allocations of a finite economy are characterized as allocations that
belong to the Edgeworth bargaining set of every replicated economy. Before
presenting this generic equivalence result, let us state some previous lemmas.
Lemma 3.5.1. Let x be a non-Walrasian feasible allocation in the economy E .
Then, for each i, there exists a sequence of rational numbers rki ∈ (0, 1] converging
to 1 and there is a sequence of allocations (xk, k ∈ IN) which converges to x such
that: (i)
￿n
i=1 r
k
i x
k
i ≤
￿n
i=1 r
k
i ωi, (ii) xki ￿i xi for every i, and (iii) xki ￿i xk+1i
for every k and every i.
Proof. Observe that if a sequence of allocations xk converges to x and xki ￿i xi,
for every i and k, then, under continuity of preferences, condition (iii) holds by
taking a subsequence if necessary.
Let x be a feasible allocation. If x is not Pareto optimal then, for every i,
there exists yi such that
￿n
i=1 yi ≤
￿n
i=1 ωi and yi ￿i xi. The sequence given by
xki =
1
kyi + (1− 1k )xi fulfills the requirements of the Lemma with rki = 1 for all i
and k.
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Now let x be a non-Walrasian feasible allocation which is eﬃcient. Then, by
the assumptions on endowments and preferences, there exist rational numbers
ai ∈ (0, 1] (with aj < 1 for some j; otherwise x would be non Pareto optimal) and
bundles yi for all i = 1, . . . , n, such that
￿n
i=1 ai(yi−ωi) = −δ, with δ ∈ IR￿++ and
yi ￿i xi, for every i (see Hervés-Beloso and Moreno-García, 2001, for details).
Let a =
￿n
i=1 ai. Given ε ∈ (0, 1], let yεi = εyi + (1 − ε)xi. By convexity
of preferences, yεi ￿i xi for every i. Consider the bundle xεi = xi + εδaε , where
aε = (1− ε)(n− a). By monotonicity of preferences, xεi ￿i xi for every i.
Take a sequence of rational numbers εk converging to zero and, for each k
and i, let aki = (1− εk)(1− ai), rki = ai + aki ∈ (0, 1], and define the commodity
bundle xki = airki y
εk
i +
aki
rki
xεki . Therefore, by construction, the sequences rki and xki
(i = 1, . . . , n and k ∈ IN) verify the required properties.7
Q.E.D.
This lemma shows that if we have a non-Walrasian allocation x in the finite
economy E , then there is a sequence of (Aubin) objections converging to x where
rational rates of participation are arbitrarily close to 1 for every consumer. In
particular, we have a sequence of objections to x in the replicated economies in
which every objection is given by a coalition involving all the types of agents and
an equal-treatment allocation.
To state our next lemma, let us consider the rational parameters rki ∈ (0, 1], i ∈
N obtained in Lemma 3.5.1 and state the following notation. Let rk =
￿n
i=1 r
k
i
and rˆki = rki /rk, i = 1, . . . , n. Let also r¯ki =
￿i−1
h=0 rˆ
k
h, with rˆk0 = 0. Finally, let
Ekc be the continuum economy with n types of agents, where consumers in the
subinterval Iki are of type i (i.e, have endowments ωi and preferences ￿i), being
Iki =
￿
r¯ki−1, r¯
k
i
￿
for every i = 1, . . . , n − 1 and Ikn =
￿
r¯kn−1, 1
￿
. Note that the
allocation xk defines a feasible allocation fk in the continuum economy Ekc given
by the step function fk(t) = xki for every t ∈ Iki .
7Note that by construction the next equalities hold:
n￿
i=1
rki
￿
xki − ωi
￿
=
n￿
i=1
￿
aiy
εk
i + a
k
i x
εk
i
￿− n￿
i=1
aiωi −
n￿
i=1
aki ωi =
= εk
n￿
i=1
ai(yi − ωi) +
n￿
i=1
(1− εk)xi −
n￿
i=1
(1− εk)aiωi −
n￿
i=1
aki ωi+
εkδ
(n−a)
n￿
i=1
(1− ai) =
n￿
i=1
(1− εk)xi −
n￿
i=1
(1− εk)aiωi −
n￿
i=1
aki ωi
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Lemma 3.5.2. Assume that x is not a Walrasian allocation but belongs to the
Edgeworth bargaining set of every replicated economy. Then, for every k, there
is a justified objection in the sense of Mas-Colell8 to the allocation fk in the
continuum economy Ekc .
Proof. Let qk be a natural number such that rki = bki /qk, with bki ∈ IN for
each i = 1, . . . , n. Since x ∈ ￿r∈INB(rE), we have that the allocation xk cannot
be a Walrasian allocation for the economy formed by bki agents of type i; oth-
erwise, the coalition formed by bki members of each type i joint with xk would
define a justified objection in the qk-replicated economy.9 Then, fk cannot be
a competitive allocation in the continuum economy Ekc . By Mas-Colell’s (1989)
equivalence result, fk is blocked by a Walrasian objection in the economy Ekc .
That is, there is a coalition Sk blocking fk via gk that is a competitive allocation
at equilibrium price pk for the economy restricted to the coalition Sk. Then, by
convexity of preferences, we can consider without loss of generality that gk is an
equal-treatment allocation. In addition, pk ·y > pk ·ωi if y ￿i xki , for every i such
that µ(Sk ∩ Ii) = 0.
Q.E.D.
Let ∆ =
￿
p ∈ IR￿+|
￿￿
h=1 ph = 1
￿
and let di (from ∆ into IR￿+) denote the
demand correspondence for consumer i, characterized by preferences ￿i and en-
dowments ωi ∈ IR￿++, in the finite economy E . The excess demand correspondence
for consumer i is given by Zi(p) = di(p)− ωi for each p ∈ ∆. Let Π be the map-
ping that associates to each economy its Walrasian equilibrium prices. Thus,
p ∈ Π(E) if and only if 0 ∈￿ni=1 Zi(p) = Z(p).
Note that when determining the market-clearing prices of an economy, it
is suﬃcient to consider only the excess demand mappings. Let Z denote the
set of excess demand correspondences from ∆ to IR￿ endowed with a metric
topology.10 Consider the excess demands Z1, . . . , Zn of the n consumers in E
8We emphasize that a justified objection in the sense of Mas-Colell defines an Aubin objec-
tion in the economy E which is justified.
9We remark that with our notion of justified objection in the replicated economies, any
objecting coalition involving all types joint with a Walrasian allocation for such a coalition
defines a justified objection. This is not the case for the corresponding Mas-Colell’s notion
which requires that if a set of agents of type i becomes strictly better oﬀ in a justified objection,
then all the agents of type i have to be members of the objecting coalition.
10We do not specify a topology here. Later on we will restrict to some subsets of Z with a
particular topology to obtain useful results.
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and the associated n-types continuum economy Ec. Then, to examine Π(E) or
equivalently Π(Ec), it suﬃces to describe Ec by the measure η on Z defined by
η(F ) =
￿
i∈TF µ(Ii), where F is any Borel subset of Z and TF = {i ∈ N |Zi ∈ F}.
Given a general continuum economy, where the set of agents is represented
by the interval I = [0, 1], the measure that describes it is given by υ(F ) =
µ ({t ∈ I|Zt ∈ F}) for each Borel set F ⊂ Z, being Zt the excess demand corre-
spondence of the agent t ∈ I.
Now, for each k let us consider the justified objection (Sk, gk) to fk obtained
in the proof of the Lemma 3.5.2. In order to define a sequence of auxiliary
continuum economies restricted to the coalitions Sk where the set of consumers
is the interval [0, 1] for every k, we state the following notation. Let γki =
µ(Sk ∩ Iki ), T k =
￿
i ∈ N |γki > 0
￿
, tk denotes the cardinality of T k and mk =
max
￿
i|i ∈ T k￿ . Let γˆk0 = 0 and γˆki = γki /µ(Sk) for every i ∈ {1, . . . n} . Note
that γˆki = 0 for every i which does not belong to T k. For each i ∈ T k, let
Iˆki =
￿
γ¯ki−1, γ¯
k
i
￿
if i ￿= mk and Iˆki =
￿
γ¯kmk−1, 1
￿
if i = mk, where γ¯ki =
￿i−1
h=0 γˆ
k
h.
Finally, let Eˆkc be the continuum economy with tk types of agents, where for each
i ∈ T k, consumers in the subinterval Iˆki are of type i.
Lemma 3.5.3. Let νk be the measure describing the auxiliary continuum economy
Eˆkc , defined by the justified objection to fk, in which the measure of agents of type
i is γˆki . There exists a subsequence of measures that converges weakly to a measure
ν describing the limit economy Eˆc.
Proof. Since the number of types of consumers we deal with is finite, without
loss of generality we can consider, taking a subsequence if necessary, that T k = T
for every k. Note that γˆki ∈ (0, 1] for every i ∈ T and
￿
i∈T γˆ
k
i = 1 for every k.
Therefore, there exists a subsequence of (γˆki , i ∈ T ) that converges to (γi, i ∈ T )
and
￿
i∈T γi = 1. We use the same notation for such a subsequence and write γki
converges to γi for every i ∈ T. Let Eˆc be the continuum economy with a finite
number of types where the set of agents of type i is represented by a subinterval
of [0, 1] whose measure is γi.
Let (Zi, i ∈ T ) be the excess demand correspondences of the types that are
actually present in every economy Eˆkc . The measure νk that describes Eˆkc is
given by νk(F ) = µ ({t ∈ I such that Zt ∈ F}) for each subset F of Z. Let us
define a function τ which assigns to each F ⊂ Z the subset of types τ(F ) =
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{i ∈ T |Zi ∈ F} . Then, νF =
￿
i∈τ(F ) γˆ
k
i . We deduce that
lim
k→∞
νk(F ) = lim
k→∞
￿
i∈τ(F )
γˆki =
￿
i∈τ(F )
γi = ν(F ),
where ν is the measure describing the economy Eˆc. Therefore, we can conclude
that νk converges weakly to ν.
Q.E.D.
Next, under a continuity assumption regarding the equilibrium prices map-
ping, we state a convergence result for the Edgeworth bargaining set we have
defined.
Theorem 3.5.1. Assume that the equilibrium price correspondence is continuous
at the measure ν describing the economy Eˆc. Then, an allocation is Walrasian in
the finite economy E if and only if it belongs to the Edgeworth bargaining set of
every replicated economy. That is,
W (E) =
￿
r∈IN
B(rE).
Proof. Since W (E) is included in the core of every replicated economy rE , it is
immediate that W (E) ⊆ ￿r∈INB(rE).
To show the converse, assume that x is not a Walrasian allocation but x
belongs to the Edgeworth bargaining set of every replicated economy. By the
previous lemmas, for each natural number k, there is a subset T of types and
competitive equilibrium (pk, gk) in the continuum economy Eˆkc such that:
(i) gki ￿i xki for every i ∈ T, with gkj ￿j xkj for some j ∈ T, and gki ∈ di(pk) for
every i ∈ T, and
(ii) xki ￿i di(pk) for every i ∈ N \ T.11
Let us consider the following sets of types that do not belong to T : Ak =￿
i /∈ T |xi ￿i di(pk)
￿
, Bk =
￿
i /∈ T |xi ≺i di(pk)
￿
. Since the number of types is
finite, without loss of generality we can consider, taking a subsequence if it is
necessary, that Ak = A and Bk = B for every k.
11Note that, given a price vector p, all the bundles in di(p) are indiﬀerent; thus, when we
write z ￿i di(p) it means z ￿i d for every d ∈ di(p).
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We recall that the economy Eˆkc , which is described by the measure νk on Z, is
formed by agents of type i ∈ T and each type i is represented by the subinterval Iˆki
with measure γˆki . Moreover, the sequence of measures
￿
νk
￿
k∈IN converges weakly
to ν. Let us choose a sequence of numbers δk ∈ (0, 1) converging to 1 and let
εk = 1 − δk, which converges to zero. For each i ∈ B take εki > 0 such that
εk =
￿
i∈B ε
k
i . Let T1 = T ∪ B and for each i ∈ T1 define ￿γki ∈ (0, 1) as follows:
￿γki =
 δkγˆ
k
i if i ∈ T
εki if i ∈ B
Note that
￿
i∈T1 ￿γki = 1.
For each k, define the continuum economy ￿Ekc formed by agents of types in T1
and such that each agent of type i is represented by a subinterval with measure￿γki . Let ￿νk denote the measures on Z describing the economy ￿Ekc . Note that
limk→∞ ￿γki = limk→∞ γˆki = γi for every i ∈ T and ￿γki goes to zero as k increases
for every i ∈ B. Then, the economy ￿Ekc diﬀers from Eˆkc only in at most a finite
set of types of agents whose measure goes to zero when k increases. Therefore,
the sequence of measures
￿￿νk￿
k∈IN also converges weakly to ν.
Now, for each k and for each i ∈ T1 = T ∪B, take a sequence of positive ratio-
nal numbers rkmi converging to ￿γki when m increases and such that￿i∈T1 rkmi = 1
for every m. In this way, for each k, let us define a sequence of continuum econo-
mies Ekmc formed by agents of types in T1 and such that each agent of type i is
represented by a subinterval with rational measure rkmi . Let us take the diagonal
sequence of economies
￿Ekkc ￿k∈IN and let νkk be the measure on Z that describes
Ekkc . Note that limk→∞ rkki = limk→∞ γˆki for every i ∈ T and limk→∞ rkki = 0 for
every i ∈ B. Then, the sequence of measures ￿νkk￿
k∈IN converges weakly to ν as
well.
Therefore, by the continuity of the equilibrium price correspondence at ν
and for k large enough, any competitive equilibrium price of the economy Eˆkc is
arbitrarily close to an equilibrium price of the economy Ekkc , while both of them
lie within a neighborhood of the set of equilibrium price of the limit economy Eˆc
described by the measure ν.
Then, by the continuity of the equilibrium mapping at ν and the continuity of
preferences, we deduce that for every k large enough there is an equilibrium price￿pk1 for the economy Ekkc such that di(￿pk1) ￿i xi for every i ∈ T1. If xi ￿i di(￿pk1) for
every i ∈ A, we have found a Walrasian objection to x in a replicated economy,
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which is a contradiction with the fact that x belongs to the Edgeworth bargain-
ing set of every replicated economy. Otherwise, let ￿Ak = ￿i /∈ T1|xi ￿i di(￿pk1)￿ ,￿Bk = ￿i /∈ T1|xi ≺i di(￿pk1)￿ . As before, without loss of generality, taking a sub-
sequence if it is necessary, we can consider ￿Ak = ￿A and ￿Bk = ￿B for every k.
Let T2 = T1 ∪ ￿B and repeat the analogous argument. In this way, after a finite
number h of iterations we have either (i) Th = N = {1, . . . , n} or (ii) N \Th ￿= ∅
but
￿
i /∈ Th|xi ≺i di(￿pkh)￿ = ∅. If (i) occurs we find a justified objection to x in
a replicated economy which involves all the types of agents. If (ii) is the case,
there is also a justified objection to x in a replicated economy but involving only
a strict subset of types. In any situation we obtain a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
The assumptions on endowments and preferences in our finite economy E allow
us to ensure that the excess demands Zi, i ∈ N, obey the desirability condition
that if a sequence of prices pn converges to p, a boundary point of ∆, then
￿Zi(pn)￿ goes to ∞. Assume in addition that the excess demand mappings are
limited to be continuously diﬀerentiable functions from the interior of ∆. If we
metrize the space Z by requiring uniform convergence of the functions and their
first derivatives on compact sets, the set of economies (described by measures, as
above) on which the equilibrium price correspondence Π is continuous is open and
dense in the topology of weak convergence. (See Dierker, 1973, or Hildenbrand,
1974). Moreover, if we drop the requirement that the functions be continuously
diﬀerentiable, requiring only continuity, we still have that the set of economies
on which Π is continuous is a dense subset. In fact, it is a residual set, that
is, the countable intersection of open dense sets. Thus, in this framework, we
can say that the convergence of the Edgeworth bargaining sets to the Walrasian
allocations is generic.
3.6 An exact convergence result: Edgeworth bar-
gaining set with leader
Neither the concept of bargaining set by Mas-Colell (1989) nor our Edgeworth
bargaining set imposes any restriction on the members that may belong to an
objecting or counter-objecting coalition. However, the definition of bargaining
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set for cooperative games introduced by Aumann and Maschler (1964) and Davis
and Maschler (1963), requires that the original objection has to be proposed by
an agent that acts as a “leader”, meaning that this agent cannot belong to any
counterobjecting coalition. In addition, Geanakoplos (1978) gave an alterna-
tive definition of leader, modifying the one by Aumann-Davis-Maschler in such
a way that the “leader” could be not just one agent, but a group of agents.
Thus, the Aumann-Davis-Maschler concept of leader would be a particular case
of Geanakoplos’.
It is important to remark that the designation of a leader makes a profound
diﬀerence in the resulting bargaining sets, especially when the economy is en-
larged with the aim of studying convergence properties. Indeed, the bargaining
sets convergence results that have already been obtained in the related literature
depend crucially on the presence of a leader or a group of leaders (see Geanako-
plos, 1978, Shapley and Shubik, 1984 and Anderson, 1998). In this section, we
provide a notion of bargaining set which involves the concept of a leader that is
understood as a type of agents. This solution allows us to show that when we
replicate the economy, the bargaining set shrinks and converges to the set of Wal-
rasian allocations, in a similar way as the Debreu-Scarf’s convergence theorem
for the core, without any additional continuity property of the equilibrium cor-
respondence as it has been required for the previous generic convergence result.
Thus, in which follows, we incorporate the presence of a leader to the Edgeworth
bargaining set concept and then we obtain an exact convergence result.
Consider an objection (S, y) to the allocation rx in rE . That is, there are
ri ≤ r agents of each type i ∈ S such that
￿
i∈S riyi ≤
￿
i∈S riωi and yi ￿i xi
for every i ∈ S, with strict preference for some j ∈ S. We remark that without
loss of generality we assume rh = r for some h ∈ S.
The objection (S, y) to rx in the economy rE is L-counter-objected if for every
i ∈ S, with ri = r, there exits a counter-objection (T, z), with i /∈ T, in some
replicated economy rˆE with rˆ ≥ r. In other words, an objection (S, y) to rx in
the economy rE is L-justified if there exists i ∈ S, with ri = r, such that any
counter-objection (T, z) in rˆE with rˆ ≥ r requires that i belongs to T.
We say that the feasible allocation x belongs to the leader bargaining set of
rE and we write x ∈ BL(rE) if the allocation rx has no L-justified objection.
We remind that, for every r, the set of Walrasian allocations of the economy E
is contained in the core of rE which is contained in BL(rE).
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We stress that in our definition, a leader consists in a group of individuals of
the same type. Furthermore, every type that participates with all its agents in
an objection can be designated as a leader. Then, in our notion a leader becomes
a type. Moreover, according to our leader bargaining set, for any natural number
r, there is rˆ ≥ r such that BL(rˆE) ⊆ BL(rE). To see this, note that obviously we
have BL(2rE) ⊆ BL(rE).
Theorem 3.6.1. The allocation x is Walrasian in the economy E if and only if
x belongs to the leader bargaining set of every replicated economy. That is,￿
r∈IN
BL(rE) = W (E).
Proof. SinceW (E) ⊂ C(rE) ⊂ B(rE), it is immediate thatW (E) ⊆ ￿r∈INBL(rE).
To show the converse, consider x ∈ ￿r∈INBL(rE) and assume that x is not a
Walrasian allocation in the economy E . Let us consider the corresponding step
function fx in the associated continuum economy Ec. We have that fx does not
belong to BMC(Ec). Then, there exists a justified objection to fx following Mas-
Colell’s definition in Ec. By convexity of preferences, Remark 5 in Mas-Colell
(1989) allows us to ensure that there is a justified objection to x that is given by
(S, y) and parameters αi, i ∈ S, such that
￿
i∈S αiyi ≤
￿
i∈S αiωi, yi ￿i xi for
every i ∈ S and yj ￿j xj for some j ∈ S. Moreover, αj = 1 and yi ∼i xi for every
i such that αi < 1.
If S = {j} the pair ({j}, yj) is an objection in every replicated economy. Then,
for every rE there is a collection T of types which excludes j and an allocation z
such that (T, z) counter-objects ({j}, yj). Then we can find a counter-objection
in Ec to the justified objection, which is a contradiction.
Now consider that S contains not only the type j. By continuity of preferences,
we can take ε such that (1−ε)yj ￿j xj. Let α =
￿
i∈S
i ￿=j
αi and define the allocation
y˜ as follows:
y˜i =
 (1− ε)yi if i = jyi + εyjα if i ￿= j
By construction,
￿
i∈S αiy˜i ≤
￿
i∈S αiωi. Since preferences are monotone y˜i ￿i
xi for every i ∈ S. Actually, y˜i ￿i yi ￿i xi, for every i ￿= j.
As in the proof of Lemma 3.5.2, for every natural k ∈ IN, let αki , i ∈ S be the
smallest integer greater than or equal to kαi. Let us denote yki = kαiαki (y˜i−ωi)+ωi.
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Note that yki converges to y˜i for every i ∈ S and then, by continuity of preferences,
we have that yki ￿i xi for every i ∈ S and for all k large enough. In addition,
yki ￿i yi ￿i xi for every i ￿= j and for all k large enough. We remark that
ykj = (1− ε)yj and αkj = 1 for every k.
Then, the coalition with αki agents of type i ￿= j with i ∈ S, and k agents of
type j, blocks x via yk in the replicated economy kE . Therefore, there exists a
counter-objection (T, z) to the objection (S, yk) in some replicated economy rE
with r ≥ k, such that j /∈ T. Thus, for every i ∈ T, there exists a natural number
βi ≤ r, such that
￿
i∈T βizi ≤
￿
i∈T βiωi, zi ￿i yki ￿i yi for every i ∈ T ∩ S
and zi ￿i xi for every i ∈ T \ S. This is a contradiction with the fact that the
objection (S, y) defines a justified objection to fx in the associated continuum
economy.
Q.E.D.
This convergence result depends crucially on the consideration of “leaders”
(understood as types) when an objection is proposed in the sequence of replicated
economies. The underlying argument is that when an objection is proposed by
a leader, any counterobjecting coalition must exclude this leader. It is also the
presence of a leader (either as an individual or as a group) in the objection
process what allows the convergence results that have already been obtained in
the literature. Geanakoplos (1978) considered a modified notion12 of the Davis-
Machler definition and showed that his bargaining set becomes asymptotically
competitive as the number of agents grows. Shapley and Shubik (1984) showed
that the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set converges in replica sequences
of TU exchange economies with smooth preferences. Anderson (1998) extended
both Geanakoplos and Shapley and Shubik results to sequences of NTU exchange
economies, weakening some assumptions such as smoothness of preferences.
Roughly speaking, the aforementioned convergence results show that diﬀerent
notions of bargaining set involving the presence of a leader can approximately
be decentralized by prices for large economies. Therefore, these works point out
that the Geneakoplos bargaining set and the Aumann and Maschler bargaining
12Geneakoplos (1978) modified the Davis-Maschler definition by considering that the “leader”
was a group of agents containing a fixed (but small) fraction of the number of agents in the
economy; thus, as the number of agents grows along the sequence of economies, the number
of individuals in the “leader” grows proportionately. However, this modified notion does not
require the individuals in the group to be of the same type as our notion does.
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set have better convergence properties than Mas-Colell’s.
Our convergence theorem adds to this line of research, showing that it makes a
fundamental diﬀerence for the asymptotic analysis of the Edgeworth bargaining
sets whether one requires that there is a group of leaders or not. The notion of
bargaining set with leader we state diﬀers from those that have been considered in
the related literature and, in turn, neither our convergence result can be deduced
from the previous ones nor vice-versa. Moreover, we show that the intersection
of the bargaining sets of the sequence of the replicated economies coincides with
the set of Walrasian allocations, providing an extension of the Debreu-Scarf core-
convergence to bargaining sets which is not the case of the already obtained
asymptotic theorems that show a convergence in measure (Anderson, 1998).
Chapter 4
Stability in price competition
revisited
4.1 Introduction
We state and analyze a game with incomplete information where firms compete
in prices. In the model, the strategic opportunities which determine the market
power are aﬀected not only by prices but also by attributes of firms to attract
costumers, leading to continuous residual demand functions. We will refer to
this continuous, smooth kind of competition as “stability”. Thus, this work adds
to the literature on price competition which goes back to the classical Bertrand
model that has originated numerous studies with alternative assumptions on
economic primitives.
In this scenario of oligopolistic price competition, the formulations of the
demands faced by firms play a key role. Diﬀerent ways of defining these residual
demands lead to diﬀerent games with a variety of equilibrium notions and a wide
range of results. For instance, the demand each firm faces may depend on the
consumers’ information. This is the case of the works by Salop and Stiglitz (1977)
and Varian (1980), who considered only two kinds of consumers: informed and
uniformed. Search theory is also broadly used to deal with the matter (see, for
instance, Stahl ,1989, Janssen and Moraga-González, 2004 or Janssen, Moraga-
González and Wildenbeest, 2005).
The majority of the models where firms select prices and the demands ab-
sorbed by firms depend on the ratio between informed and non informed con-
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sumers lack stability in competition due to the discontinuity of demands. We
consider a market where neither all informed consumers choose the firm with the
lowest price nor all uninformed costumers choose randomly among all firms that
charge a price of the good below their reservation price. It is not easy to argue
that arbitrarily small variations in the prices lead to significant changes in the
demand functions. This was already pointed out by Hotelling (1929); if a seller
gradually increases the price of a good while her rivals keep their prices fixed,
sales will diminish continuously, rather than fall in an abrupt way. This line of
arguments leads to the analysis of competition under stability.
The stability in competition in our model appears as the result of incorpo-
rating a variable into the residual demand functions which we refer to as “type”
of the firm, allowing for gradual shiftings of consumers from one firm to another
when they perceive diﬀerences in the price of the good. This variable represents
certain attributes of the firms which may be perceived diﬀerently by consumers
and may encompass many diﬀerent features, like reputation, kind sellers, crowd-
ing eﬀects, or even something as simple as having heating in winter time, or air
conditioning in summer1. Overall, the type of the firms captures their ability to
attract consumers, and goes in the line of Hotelling (1929) when he mentioned
that some consumers buy the good in a certain place and others buy it in a
diﬀerent one, in spite of small diﬀerences in the price. On the other hand, these
abilities of the firms are not necessarily perfectly known and, as we have already
remarked, can be perceived in a diﬀerent way by each consumer. Therefore, we
introduce a game which allows for incomplete information in the type variable
where firms compete in prices, and where such competition takes place in a stable
way.
To be more precise, given a strategy profile (prices selected for each firm),
the demand functions depend continuously on both prices and types of the firms
which are underlain by their attributes or abilities to attract consumers and be-
come an incomplete information issue. Therefore, the payoﬀ functions depend
on the prices chosen by all the firms and also on all their types . It is important
1Indeed, we can find somehow the idea of the type variable in Hotelling’s work, when he
mentions some reasons for which a costumer would prefer to buy a good in one shop than in
another even if she pays more for the good, such as location, way of doing business, family
relationship or friendship with the owner, etc. While Hotelling’s work focuses on location, we
intend to provide a framework where the type variable may encompass any of the aforemen-
tioned examples. In some sense, this work can be understood as a variant of Hotelling’s work
with incomplete information.
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to remark that such a type variable is not a strategy for any firm. Thus, in this
game there is an exogenous information structure which is a probability distri-
bution on the set of type vector and is common knowledge for the firms. When
this probability distribution is degenerated we are in the complete information
scenario.
Under standard assumptions, we show existence of equilibrium in distribu-
tional strategies.2 We also prove that there exists an approximate equilibrium in
pure strategies for this game. We emphasize that, in the incomplete information
setting, a pure strategy of a firm is a function that assigns a price to each type.
A game with demand functions which are linear on prices illustrates this point.
The model we consider opens up the possibility of testing it with diﬀerent
specifications of the information structure and the demands, which lead to many
diﬀerent games, explaining a variety of concerns in the light of a price competition
analysis under stability.
First, taking residual demand functions which are linear in prices, and in a
context of incomplete information, price dispersion arises as an equilibrium in
pure strategies, in contrast with other approaches that explain this phenomenon
by means of a mixed strategy equilibrium (see, for instance, Varian, 1980). Then,
we also explore whether the incomplete information framework might give some
firms advantages over the complete information situation. For it, using the same
game, we show that in the equilibrium, the expected payoﬀs of a firm are higher
under uncertainty on its type than in a complete information scenario. There-
fore, an analysis of the expected payoﬀs under complete or incomplete informa-
tion would be an interesting exercise for the firms in order to apply it to their
advertising policy: depending on the result, firms may prefer to advertise in such
a way their type becomes public information, or on the contrary, to do it trying
to keep their type “hidden”.
Next, we consider a particular formulation of the residual demands by sep-
arating the eﬀects of prices and types. Within this setting, we state a game
which not only provides a diﬀerent way to overcome the Bertrand paradox, but
also shows that its equilibrium results in a monopolistic competition situation,
in accordance with the view of Chamberlin (1933, 1937), when the number of
firms increases.
2We remark that Milgrom andWeber (1985) showed that distributional strategies are simply
another way of representing mixed and/or behavioral strategies.
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Finally, we observe that consumers sometimes choose a certain shop even
though they are aware that the price of the good is slightly more expensive than
in another. We argue that in this case, what is happening is that the type variable
has almost all the eﬀect in the distribution of demand. In other words, types
become a relevant variable only when the diﬀerence in prices is small enough.
On the other hand, when the diﬀerences among prices are suﬃciently large, the
eﬀect of types becomes negligible and the firm charging the lowest price faces
all the demand. We remark that this can be carried out in a continuous way,
preserving stability in competition. We state specific demands highlighting this
fact. In this case, we point out that our analysis allows for a better explanation
of the degree of price dispersion.
4.2 The game
Let us consider a continuum of consumers3 represented by the interval [0, 1], who
desire to buy, at most, one unit of a commodity. Every consumer has the same
reservation price r, which is the maximum price they are willing to pay for the
good.
There are n firms or stores that produce the commodity and each one has a
continuous cost function Ci : [0, 1]→ IR+ defined on the measures of customers,
i = 1, . . . , n. Firms have market power and compete in prices. When there is
price competition, the demand each firm faces (residual demands) becomes cru-
cial. We consider a scenario with stability in competition in the sense that small
changes in prices do not lead to abrupt modifications in the residual demands.
This relies on the fact that firms have relevant abilities or attributes to attract
customers. That is, each firm has a set of possible types corresponding to the
values its attributes can take and diﬀerent type vectors may lead to diﬀerent as-
signments of buyers among firms. Then, the residual demands depend not only
on prices but also on the profile of types.
The type variable encompasses several features. For instance, it may be in-
terpreted in terms of reputation, crowding types, transmission of the degree of
satisfaction by previous clients, skills of each firm’s employees or any other char-
3Note that the consideration of a continuum of consumers allows us to provide reasons for
their non-strategic behavior. We might also consider a large number of consumers as in Varian
(1980).
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acteristic of the firm itself which aﬀects the number of customers it is able to
get.
Let ti denote the type variable of firm i whose values lie in a set T ⊂ IR+. The
prior probability distributions on the types is assumed to be common knowledge
and is given by an information structure η which is a probability measure on T n.
Let ηi, i = 1, . . . , n, be the marginal distributions of η.
In this incomplete information setting, a strategy is a complete plan of actions
that covers every contingency of the game. That is, a pure strategy for firm i is
a measurable function from T to Ki, being Ki a closed real subinterval of [0, r],
where firm i selects a price.4 Moreover, a distributional strategy5 for the firm i
is given by a probability measure on T ×Ki for which the marginal distribution
on T is ηi, that is, the one specified by the information structure. Note that pure
strategies are in one-to-one correspondence with distributional strategies whose
conditional distributions are Dirac measures for each type.
To define the payoﬀ functions of the game, given a vector of types t ∈ T n and
a vector of prices p ∈ K = K1× . . .×Kn, let us define the function πi as follows:
πi(t, p) = di(t, p)pi − Ci(di(t, p)),
where di(t, p) is the demand that firm i faces whenever the vector of types is t and
firms chooses prices p. We point out that, given a strategy profile of prices p and
the vector of types t, the aggregate demand equals 1, that is,
￿n
i=1 di(t, p) = 1
for every (t, p) ∈ T n ×K.
We state the following regularity assumptions on the game. These hypothesis
allow us to express the players’ expected payoﬀ (firms’ expected profits) in a
convenient manner and, moreover, to get existence results for both distributional
strategy equilibria and pure strategy approximate equilibria, which we define
later on.
(A.1) The informational variable ti belongs to a compact set T ⊂ IR+ for every
firm i = 1, ..., n.
(A.2) The measure η is absolutely continuous with respect ηˆ = η1× . . .× ηn. Let
f be the density of η with respect to ηˆ.
4For instance, if we consider a technology resulting in strictly decreasing average costs, we
may consider Ki = [δi, r], where δi is the minimum average cost Ci(1).
5See Milgrom and Weber (1985) for a discussion on distributional, mixed and behavioral
strategies.
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(A.3) The residual demand di : T n×K→ [0, 1] is a continuous function for every
firm i = 1, . . . , n.
Note that the continuity requirement in (A.3) guarantees that the functions
πi, i = 1, . . . , n, are continuous, which is a standard condition in games with in-
complete information. We remark that, this assumption (A.3) bears the stability
in competition property. We also observe that the assumption (A.1) guarantees
the equicontinuity property of the functions (t, p) → πi(t, p) which is the usual
hypothesis to obtain purification results.
Given a profile (ν1, . . . , νn) of distributional strategies, assumption (A.2) al-
lows us to write the expected payoﬀ Πi to firm i as follows:
Πi(ν1, . . . , νn) =
￿
Tn×K
πi(t, p) f(t) dν1 . . . dν1
The price competition game G with incomplete information is defined by the
informational structure η, the strategy set Ki for each firm i = 1, ..., n and the
payoﬀ functions Πi, i = 1, ..., n.
A profile (ν1, . . . , νn) of distributional strategies is an equilibrium of the game
G if Πi(ν1, . . . , νn) ≥ Πi(ν1, . . . , ν ￿i, . . . , νn) for every firm i and every alternative
distributional strategy ν ￿i.
Theorem 4.2.1. The set of equilibrium points in distributional strategies for the
game G is non empty.
Proof. First, assumption (A.3) guarantees that the functions πi, 1 = 1, . . . , n
are continuous. By assumptions (A.1) the type set is compact and therefore the
continuity of πi(t, ·) is uniform over types t.
Second, by assumption (A.2) the game G has absolutely continuous informa-
tion. Therefore, we conclude that there exists a distributional strategy equili-
brium for the game G (see theorem 1 in Milgrom and Weber, 1985).6
Q.E.D.
An ε-equilibrium point of the game G is an n-tuple (ν1, . . . , νn) such that
Πi(ν1, . . . , νn) + ε ≥ Πi(ν1, . . . , ν ￿i, . . . , νn) for every firm i and every alternative
6We remark that this existence result by Milgrom and Weber (1985) was extended by Balder
(1988) to a setting with abstract type spaces under weaker assumptions in the payoﬀ functions
and the proofs are based it the theory of weak convergence for transition probabilities. See
also Balder (2004) for more recent developments.
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strategy ν ￿i. That is, we have an approximate equilibrium (i.e., ε-equilibrium)
whenever every firm is not able to increase its expected profit more than ε by
deviating unilaterally.
Theorem 4.2.2. If each ηi is atomless, then for every ε > 0 there exists a pure
strategy ε-equilibrium point for the game G.
Proof. Since each ηi is atomless, it follows that for every player, the set of degen-
erated distributional strategies (those which are in one-to-one correspondence
with pure strategies) is dense in her set of distributional strategies (see theo-
rem 3 in Milgrom and Weber, 1985). This denseness property together with the
equicontinuity properties of the functions πi allow us to conclude, as in Milgrom
and Weber (1985), that for any mixed strategy equilibrium we can find an ε-
equilibrium in pure strategies which is actually arbitrarily close to the former
(for the weak∗ topology).
Q.E.D.
For the special situation where the payoﬀ function for each firm depends only
on her own type and each firm’s strategy set is restricted to a finite subset, the
Theorem 4 in Milgrom and Weber (1985) allows us to conclude that the game
with incomplete information has an equilibrium point in pure strategies.
Representing stability in competition by means of an additional variable al-
lows us to consider and analyze diﬀerent scenarios to illustrate special economic
situations. In other words, the generality of the model allows us to specify dif-
ferent residual demands, which lead to diﬀerent games, each of them shedding
light on a precise issue in an industrial economics framework. This is the aim in
the remainder of the chapter.
Price dispersion as pure strategy equilibrium Consider two firms com-
peting in prices and facing residual demands that depend continuously on prices
and types. Both have just fixed costs and choose prices in [0, r], where r is
the reservation price of their customers represented by the unit interval [0, 1].
The type of each firm takes values in the closed interval [1, 2]. 7 The demands
associated to firms are given by
d1(p1, p2, t1, t2) = − t2
t1 + t2
p1 +
t1
t1 + t2
p2 +
1
2
and
d2(p1, p2, t1, t2) = − t1
t1 + t2
p2 +
t2
t1 + t2
p1 +
1
2
.
7We consider T = [1, 2] for simplicity.
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Consider the informational structure such that the type of firm 1 is known,
namely, t1 = c, while the type of firm 2 is uniformly distributed in [1, 2]. Then,
some calculations show that there is an equilibrium in pure strategies given by
p¯ =
1￿ 2
1
t
t+cdµ(t)
=
1
1 + c ln 1+c2+c
and p(t) =
2tp1 + t+ c
4c
,
where p¯ is the price charged by firm 1 and p : [1, 2]→ [0, r] is the pure strategy for
firm 2 defining the equilibrium. Note that since there is incomplete information
regarding the type of firm 2, a pure strategy for this firm assigns a price to
each type. We remark that in this case price dispersion arises as pure strategy
equilibrium of a game with incomplete information.
Observe that when the informational structure η is given by a Dirac measure
on the set of vector of types T n, there exists just one possible profile of types
t ∈ T n. Therefore, in this situation, the uncertainty disappears and then we
recast a complete information game, where the payoﬀ functions are πi(t, ·) :
K → IR, i = 1, . . . , n. The continuity of these functions ensures existence of
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.8 Furthermore, if for every i, the profit
πi(t, ·) is also quasi-concave in the strategy (price) selected by firm i, there is
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Therefore, our framework paves the way to
compare equilibria with complete and incomplete information.
Complete vs. incomplete information. Consider again the previous
game but with complete information. For every vector of types (t1, t2), there is
an equilibrium in pure strategies, given by p∗1 = t1+t22t2 and p
∗
2 =
t1+t2
2t1
, which leads
to profits π∗1 = t1+t24t2 and π
∗
2 =
t1+t2
4t1
for firms 1 and 2, respectively. Then, we
find price dispersion provided that firms with diﬀerent attributes charge diﬀerent
prices whereas in the incomplete information setting price dispersion appears as
an equilibrium in pure strategies (where each firm sets a price for every type in
T ). We remark that, in this case, the ratio of prices is given by the ratio of types,
which determines the degree of dispersion of prices.
To compare, let us return to this example with incomplete information. Com-
puting the expected payoﬀs at the equilibrium, we have Π∗1 =
p¯
4 =
1
4(1+c ln 1+c2+c)
and Π∗2 =
3p¯2
8c +
p¯(3−2c)
8c +
3
32c +
1
16 for firms 1 and 2, respectively. It is not hard
to show that the equilibrium payoﬀ Π∗1 of firm 1 is increasing in its own type,
8We recall that in this normal form game a mixed strategy for firm i is a probability measure
on the set of pure strategies Ki which is compact and convex.
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whereas the equilibrium profits Π∗2 of firm 2 decrease as the type of their op-
ponent increases instead. Moreover, the equilibrium expected payoﬀ of firm 2,
when c = 2 is higher that the maximum payoﬀ that firm 2 can obtain at equili-
brium with complete information, which is attained when t1 = 1 and t2 = 2. A
conclusion from this fact is that it would aﬀect the advertising policy of firm 2
since it prefers to keep incomplete information.
4.3 Separating the eﬀects of types and prices
Let us consider a particular game where the demand that each firm gets depends
separately on the two kinds of variables that we have considered, namely, prices
and types. The way in which the prices aﬀect the demands is captured by
a function denoted by α while the implication of the types is expressed by a
function β. The overall eﬀect is then stated by a convex combination of these
functions, α and β, depending on the profiles of prices and types, respectively.
To be precise, α is a continuous function fromK to [0, 1]n, where the parameter
αi(p) defines the part of demand faced by firm i that is determined by the profile
of prices selected by the stores. On the other hand, given a vector of types t,
βi(t) reflects the proportion of consumers that firm i gets coming from such types
or abilities. That is, a realization of types t determines β(t) ∈ [0, 1]n which joint
with the previous function α aﬀect the residual demands.
Finally, the demands’ dependence on prices and types is given by a convex
combination of the aforementioned functions α and β. The balance of the corre-
sponding eﬀects is given by the weights defining such a convex combination which
may depend on the prevailing prices and types. Thus, for each (t, p) ∈ T n × K
let us consider the parameter λ(t, p) ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the residual demand for each
store i is
di(t, p) = λ(t, p)αi(p) + (1− λ(t, p))βi(t).
Let us consider this particular formulation of the residual demand in the game
with incomplete information described in the previous section. Applying Theo-
rems 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, we have existence of equilibrium in distributional strategies
and also of approximate equilibrium in pure strategies.
Note that taking λ(t, p) = 1 for every (t, p) there is no eﬀect of types and
therefore we have a game with no incomplete information. In this case, if we
78 4. STABILITY IN PRICE COMPETITION REVISITED
consider a duopoly we can obtain as a particular situation the classical Bertrand’s
model resulting in the Bertrand paradox. In addition, as the next example
points out, this way of separating types and prices eﬀects gives light to some
other interesting features of price competition even when one considers complete
information. Actually, the following price competition game highlights a way of
overcoming the Bertrand paradox that diﬀers from those that have already been
considered in the literature. Furthermore, the same game allows us to illustrate
a monopolistic competition situation à la Chamberlin (1933, 1937).
Take n > 1 firms with the same technology and consumers in [0, 1] For a set
of consumers of measure m, the cost function for every firm is C(m) = cm+ F,
where F denotes the fixed costs and c < r. Firms choose prices in the compact
set [c, r].
Let t = (t1, . . . , tn) be a vector of types of firms. For each profile of prices
p = (p1, . . . , pn), the demand faced by firm i is di(t, p) = λαi(p) + (1− λ) βi(t),
where αi(p) = 1n−1
￿
1− pi￿
j∈N pj
￿
and βi(t) = ti￿
j∈N tj
. Note that λ(·) is constant
and equals λ ∈ (0, 1). Then, the profit function for each firm i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n}
is given by
πi(t, p) = pi
￿
λ
n−1
￿
1− pipˆ
￿
+ (1−λ)ti
tˆ
￿
− C
￿
λ
n−1
￿
1− pipˆ
￿
+ (1−λ)ti
tˆ
￿
,
where pˆ =
￿
j∈N pj and tˆ =
￿
j∈N tj.
Some calculations show that the payoﬀ function πi of firm i is strictly increas-
ing in the price selected by firm i. That is, ∂πi∂pi is positive for every i. Therefore,
independently of the number n of firms and of their types, the unique Nash equi-
librium in pure strategies is the profile where all the firms charge the reservation
price r.
In this situation, for the case of a duopoly, Bertrand paradox is overcome.
Moreover, when the number of firms is enlarged, the equilibrium is also attained
when all the firms chose the reservation price r > c, although the profits of every
i tend to zero when n increases. Therefore, this example also illustrates a situ-
ation of monopolistic competition in the sense that arbitrarily small firms have
market power. It is not an explicit commodity diﬀerentiation, but the approach
leading to the definition of the residual demands that underlies this imperfect
competition situation, even though the variables defining these demands may
be interpreted as a degree of “diﬀerentiation of firms”. Moreover, the result is
the same when there are no fixed costs and then we have constant returns to
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scale. Thus, our remark is in accordance with Chamberlin (1933, 1937), who
pointed out, in contrast to Kaldor (1935), that what marks the contrast between
monopolistic competition and perfect competition is the shape of demand curve
and not the shape of the cost curve.
4.4 Types aﬀect demand only if prices are similar
In many markets the type variable becomes really eﬀective or shapes the demand
functions only when prices belong to a certain threshold. In other words, when
prices diﬀer too much the type is not a relevant variable and the firms that oﬀer
the lowest price face all the demand. However, when prices are close, individuals
are more vulnerable to the abilities of firms to attract costumers.
To address this feature, let us consider again the game presented in Section 2
where demand di that firm i faces is a continuous function on types and prices
(t, p). Given a vector of prices p ∈ K that firms select, let m(p) denote the
minimum price. Now, let us consider a threshold ε > 0 and determine the new
residual demands as follows:
dεi (t, p) =
 di(t, p) if pi ≤ m(p) + ε0 if pi > m(p) + ε
If the above demands are continuous, the additional assumptions stated in
Section 2 allow us to apply Theorems 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 obtaining existence of
equilibrium.
To illustrate how types aﬀect demands only if prices are similar, we consider
the next two diﬀerent scenarios where the demands satisfy the aforementioned
continuity property.
Consider two firms with types t1 and t2 for which the demand functions are
given as follows: If the diﬀerence between the prices is large (i.e., higher than a
given threshold) then the firm charging the lowest price gets all the demand, but
when this diﬀerence is small (i.e., below the given threshold) then the demand is
shared by both firms in such a way that the firm with the better type will face
a higher demand.
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Without loss of generality we assume t1 ≥ t2. Let us fix a threshold ε > 0 and
consider the following residual demands:
d1(t1, t2, p1, p2) =

1 if p1 < p2 − ε
1− ￿p1−p2+ε2ε ￿1+t1−t2 if | p2 − p1 |≤ ε
0 if p1 > p2 + ε
d2(t1, t2, p1, p2) =

0 if p1 < p2 − ε￿
p1−p2+ε
2ε
￿1+t1−t2 if | p2 − p1 |≤ ε
1 if p1 > p2 + ε
Note that the above demands are continuous functions and when there is a
tie they are determined by the types vector which avoids instability. We observe
that when the prices diﬀer in less than ε, the firm with a higher type absorbs a
larger part of demand. In addition, when p1 < p2− ε firm 1 gets all the demand
(i.e., firms 2 sells nothing) but once it increases the prices so that | p1 − p2 |≤ ε,
its residual demand decreases very quickly, equivalently, the demand faced by
firm 2 increases promptly. Thus, the type variable not only provides stability in
the demands but also determine the shape of such demands. (See next figures).
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In the figure on the left (resp. right) d1 (resp. d2) is represented taking
ε = 3/2, t1 = 1 and t2 = 4.
When t1−t2 = 1, we obtain the following Nash equilibrium: p1 =
￿
3
√
17−5
8
￿
ε =
0.92ε and p2 = p1+ε3 = 0.64ε. However, when both firms have the same type, we
have that the equilibrium is p1 = p2 = ε. Note that when types are diﬀerent
(t1 − t2 = 1) we obtain price dispersion. Moreover, if we understand price dis-
persion as the diﬀerence between both prices, such a dispersion is increasing
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with ε. Note also that when types are equal, we find no dispersion of prices at
equilibrium.
We conclude that at equilibrium the diﬀerence between prices is less than the
threshold. Moreover, when types are distinct, then the prices can actually be
diﬀerent and as we have obtained in the example, the diﬀerence depends on the
threshold. Thus, the type variable can explain not only price dispersion in the
sense that at equilibrium diﬀerent prices can arise, but also the degree of price
dispersion, that is, how diﬀerent the equilibrium prices can be.
Let us state a final specification of the residual demands which separate prices
and types eﬀects (as in the previous section) and, in addition, types aﬀect de-
mands only if prices are similar.
Consider two firms which produce with null variable costs. Given types t =
(t1, t2) and prices p = (p1, p2), the residual demands are di(t, p) = λ(p)αi(p) +
(1− λ(p))βi(t), i = 1, 2, where
λ(p1, p2) =

1 if |p1 − p2| > ε
p2−p1
ε if −ε ≤ p1 − p2 < 0
p1−p2
ε if 0 ≤ p1 − p2 ≤ ε
αi(p1, p2) =

1 if pi < pj
1/2 if pi = pj
0 if pi > pj
and βi(t1, t2) =
ti
t1 + t2
That is, the demands faced by firm 1 and 2 are
d1(t1, t2, p1, p2) =

1 if p1 − p2 < −ε
p2−p1
ε +
￿
1− p2−p1ε
￿
t1
t1+t2
if −ε ≤ p1 − p2 < 0￿
1− p1−p2ε
￿
t1
t1+t2
if 0 ≤ p1 − p2 ≤ ε
0 if p1 − p2 > ε
d2(t1, t2, p1, p2) = 1− d1(t1, t2, p1, p2)
As we show below, the equilibrium solution depends basically on the ratio
τ = t1/t2. Thus, first we calculate the equilibrium when types are diﬀerent and
then when they are equal.
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To obtain the best response functions when types diﬀer, two cases are consid-
ered: t1 > t2 and t2 > t1, respectively.
For the case t2 > t1, some calculations allow us to write the best response
functions as follows:
Reaction function for firm 1:

p1 =
p2
2 +
ε
2 if 0 < p2 < ε
t1
t2
p1 =
p2
2 +
ε
2
t1
t2
if ε t1t2 ≤ p2 < ε(2 + t1t2 )
p1 = p2 − ε if p2 > ε(2 + t1t2 )
Reaction function for firm 2:

p2 =
p1
2 +
ε
2 if 0 < p1 < ε
p2 = p1 if ε ≤ p1 < ε t2t1
p2 =
p1
2 +
ε
2
t2
t1
if ε t2t1 < p1 < ε(2 +
t2
t1
)
p2 = p1 − ε if p1 > ε(2 + t2t1 )
ε/2 ε 2ε 4ε
ε
2
5ε
2
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The figure above represents the reaction functions for firm 1(red line)
and for firm 2 (blue line), taking t1=1, t2 = 2, and ε = 1.5
For the case t1 > t2, the best response functions are as follows:
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Reaction function for firm 1:

p2 = 2p1 − ε if ε2 < p1 < ε
p2 = p1 if ε ≤ p1 < ε t1t2
p2 = 2p1 − ε t1t2 if ε t1t2 < p1 < ε(1 + t1t2 )
p2 = p1 + ε if p1 > ε(1 +
t1
t2
)
Reaction function for firm 2:

p2 =
p1
2 +
ε
2 if 0 < p1 < ε
t2
t1
p2 =
p1
2 +
ε
2
t2
t1
if ε t2t1 < p1 < ε(2 +
t2
t1
)
p2 = p1 − ε if p1 > ε(2 + t2t1 )
Note that in this second situation, to simplify the expressions, the reaction
function of firm 1 is written with p2 in terms of p1.
ε/2 ε 2ε 3ε5ε/2
p1
p 2
Reaction functions for firm 1(red line) and for firm 2 (blue line),
taking in this case t2=1, t2 = 1, and ε = 1.5
Let τ = t1/t2. When τ > 1 the equilibrium of this game is p1 = ε3 (1 + 2τ)
and p2 = ε3 (2 + τ) . However, when τ < 1, the equilibrium is p1 =
ε
3
￿
1 + 2τ
￿
and
p2 =
ε
3
￿
2 + 1τ
￿
. Then, at equilibrium, the firm with higher type selects a higher
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price. Moreover, the ratio of prices θ = p1/p2 does not depend on the threshold
ε and just depends on the ratio of types τ. To be precise, θ = 1+2τ2+τ if τ > 1
whereas θ = 2+τ1+2τ if τ < 1 instead. Therefore, τ and in turn the dispersion of
prices is uniformly bounded on types. As in the example 3, when both firms are
of the same type (i.e., τ = 1), they charge a same price equals to ε.
In the setting addressed in this section, when ε = 0 we have the classical
Bertrand’s price competition model. Moreover, when ε goes to zero, the contin-
uous demands dεi converge to the discontinuous residual demands which lead to
the Bertrand paradox. Thus, our approach provides a way of solving smoothly
such a paradox. This is due to the presence of stability in competition, jointly
with the consideration that types matter only when prices are similar.
4.5 Concluding remarks
We have provided a game with incomplete information, where firms compete in
prices, for which we have shown existence of diﬀerent kinds of equilibrium. We
have also specified residual demand functions, as particular cases of our model,
that lead to diﬀerent games which are used to explain several topics in industrial
economics. We have considered the case when the eﬀects of types and prices enter
separately in the residual demands, and also the situation where the types matter
only if the prices belong to a certain threshold. We have also drawn conclusions
regarding each case. For instance, we have provided alternative explanations to
those already present in the literature for the phenomenon of price dispersion
and also for the Bertrand’s paradox. In addition, our approach gives room to
compare the equilibria with complete and incomplete information.
The diﬀerent specifications of the residual demands that we have considered
lead to a decrease in the competition in the sense that the equilibrium of the game
deviates from the competitive equilibrium and therefore allows for the analysis
of several issues where market power is strengthened through the type variable,
like the case of monopolistic competition.
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